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AMERICAN FATAL ACCIDENT

STATUTES-PART I: THE
LEGISLATIVE BIRTH PAINS
WEX S. MALONE*

N AN 1808 decision at Nisi Prius,1 Lord Ellenborough stated
bluntly, without bothering to give an explanation, that the death
of a human being could not give rise to a civil action. English
courts had already committed themselves to the rule that a claim
for personal injury cannot survive the death of the victim.2 These
two propositions, operating in harness, served to erase all possibility
that the bereaved families of tort victims might derive any comfort
from the common law.3
Possibly this was not a matter of momentous importance at the
time of Ellenborough's holding. In those days deliberate homicide
accounted for most unnatural deaths, and the culprit was promptly
hanged and such lands and goods as he possessed were forfeited to
the state.4 But changes were to come rapidly. Even before Lord
Ellenborough spoke, a young Scotsman had demonstrated the enormous motive power latent in steam. Before the middle of the cen0 B.A. 1928, University of North Carolina, University of Chicago; J.D. 1931, University of North Carolina; LL.M. 1933, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University.
' Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
2Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607); 3 HoLrswoRTI, HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH LAw 576 (3d ed. 1927).

'For the history of the early common law position in cases of death in England and
America, see Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043 (1965).
The picture in England is discussed in Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common
Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605 (1960).
' The death penalty continued to be the common punishment for felony (except
clergyable offenses) until the 1827 passage of the Administration of Justice in Criminal
Cases Act, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, §§ 6-7 (1827). Forfeiture of land and chattels was
abolished in 1870 by the Act to Abolish Forfeitures for Treason and Felony, 33 9- 34
Vict., c. 23, § 1 (1870). See generally 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 457-92 (1883).
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tury, locomotives were drawing heavy trains across the country at
what were then perilous speeds. Myriads of people were swarming
to the cities where boilers were propelling the machinery of factories.
The day of the industrial and transportation accident was at hand,
and unnatural death was no longer chiefly the work of the impecunious highwayman or the angry neighbor.
Under these conditions the retention of the older rule was an
intolerable prospect. But before judges were afforded a fair opportunity to repent Lord Ellenborough's mistake, the English
Parliament moved into action: Lord Campbell's Act (the Fatal
Accident Act) came into being in 1846. 6 This was a revolutionary
measure that not only repaired previous damage done by the court
but also created a new cause of action for death on behalf of
widows and children. This new cause of action existed even where
the husband or parent would have had none if the injury had been
less than fatal. The Fatal Accident Act eventually served as the
guide for most American legislatures.
But the story of the evolution of the modern American death
statute is not a simple one. The problem of the fatal accident was
entirely novel to the lawmakers of the mid-nineteenth century. It
involved new conceptions and was fraught with complexities that
could not be anticipated. The pressures upon the legislators were
in hot competition. The immensity of the tragedy demanded
vigorous reform, but the economic needs of the emerging transportation enterprises and of the new industrial society called equally
loudly for caution and restraint. The legislative responses were
frequently ill-conceived and hastily constructed measures that were
destined either to be repealed or to be followed by a patchwork of
amendments. Even today many American death statutes bear deforming birthmarks remindful of their origin.
I
THE EAIIEST LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS

Although the English Parliament failed to face the problem of
fatal accidents until the adoption of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846,
legislative action of a general character came earlier in several states
5 The rule in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), was

not presented for reconsideration until 1873 in Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88 (1873).
69 & 10 Vict., c. 93, at 531 (1846).
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in America. In Kentucky as early as 1812 several causes of action for
personal injuries were made to survive the death of both the victim
and the wrongdoer,7 and a similar provision was made by the Arkansas legislature in 1838.8 Survival statutes were enacted in Michigan
in 1838 and Maine in 1840,9 and while coverage was limited to
assault and battery, the lawmakers of that time probably regarded
these as being the wrongs most likely to result in death. The
Massachusetts legislature, which since 1805 had consistently whittled
down the list of tort actions which did not survive at common
law, 10 provided in 1842 for the survival of actions on the case for
injuries to the person despite the death of either the victim or the
wrongdoer." Two years later, a similar measure was adopted in
Rhode Island,12 which, however, like the earlier Maine statute, was
restricted to assault and battery.
Although these six survival statutes represent the only instances
of efforts by the American legislatures to attack the fatal accident
problem in comprehensive terms prior to the English Lord Campbell's Act in 1846,13 they afford no more than a fragmentary picture
of the early American legislative scene. Then, as now, the lawmaker's sense of responsibility was most readily aroused when he
was pressed by public opinion to remedy some specific misfortune
of an impressive character. It is noteworthy in this connection that
the first early venture by Parliament with respect to survivorship had
come in response to a single dramatic situation: The statute 1 Edward
III, enacted in 1327, concerned itself only with the executors of those
persons who were slain in the dispute between the Mortimer and
7

Ky. Acts 1811, ch. 375, § 5, at 182 (assault, battery, slander, criminal conversation,
and malicious prosecution excluded), also cited in 1 Ky. DIG. STAT. LAW 88 (Morehead
: Brown 1834).
8

ARK. Rnv. STAT. ch. 4,

2 MICH.

§ 59 (1838).

Rv. STAT. pt. 3, tit. 2, ch. 3, § 7 (1838); ME. Rav. STAT. ch. 120, § 15

(1840).
10Mass. Acts 9- Laws 1805, ch. 99, § 2, at 520 (survival of actions for wrongful acts
of law officers); Mass. Laws 1822, ch. 110, § 1, at 187 (survival of actions for replevin
and trover); Mass. Laws 1829, ch. 112, § 1, at 182 (survival of actions for injury to

realty); and Mass. Laws 1834, ch. 2, at 4.
11 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1841-42, ch. 89, § 1, at 539 (1842).
12 R.I. Pub. Laws § 25, at 132 (1844). This statute also provided for survival of
miscellaneous other actions.
18 Survival provisions in Vermont, Vt. Laws 1847, No. 42, § 2, at 29, and in Connecticut, Conn. Acts 1848, ch. 5, § 2i at 7, also cited in CONN. REv. STAT. 1849, ch. 6,
§ 83, at 72, providing for survival of all personal injury claims, barely failed to qualify
for this group of measures preceding Lord Campbell's Act. However, they antedate
any general wrongful death measure in these states.
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Despenser factions
historic struggle that resulted in the deposition of Edward II. Similarly, much of the first American legislation
on death arose as a direct reaction to some vivid need which had
captured the attention of the lawmakers. As early as 1647, for
example, the colonial legislature of the Massachusetts Bay Colony
took notice of "the great peril which men, horses, teams, and other
cattle are exposed to by reason of defective bridges and highways
between Boston and Salem and elsewhere in this jurisdiction." The
lawmakers imposed a fine of one hundred pounds upon the persons
or the public body chargeable with the maintenance of any road or
bridge whose defective condition resulted in the death of a highway
user. The penalty, which was enforced by way of presentment, was
for the benefit of the parents, wife, and children of the deceased. 15
This measure was continued in substantially the same form by state
statute in 178616 and it has persisted with modifications in Massachusetts law ever since.' 7
The example of the Bay Colony was followed by a similar penal
highway death provision in Connecticut in 167318 and in New
Hampshire in 1719.19 Although the New Hampshire measure was
repealed shortly after the Revolution, 20 the Connecticut statute
remained on the books until 1848.21 When Maine broke away as
a separate state from Massachusetts in 1820, it adopted a penal provision modeled after that of the parent Commonwealth, 22 and this
23
act, with some modification, still appears in the Maine statutes.
141 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 3 (1327), providing in substance that the executors of
persons slain in this struggle should have an action with respect to the goods and
chattels of their testator. Three years later the benefits of this provision were extended
to all executors. 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1830).
'r Mass. Bay Charter & Gen. Laws 1814, ch. 23, § 4, at 269 (1698).
20 Mass. Acts & Laws 1786-87, ch. 81, at 250 (1787), also cited in 1 Laws of Mass.
1780-1807, at 386 (1807).
17Mass. Acts & Resolves 1949, ch. 427, § 1, at 365, as amended, MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 229, § 1 (Supp. 1964).
After the Revolution the substance
18 Laws of Conn. 1678, at 7 (Brinley 1865).
of the colonial measure was re-enacted in 1 Conn. Pub. Stat. Laws 1808, tit. 29, § 3, at
120.
29 N.H. Acts & Laws 1606-1725, at 151, also cited in 2 N.H. Laws 882 (Batchellor
1918).

2o Perpetual Laws of N.H. 1776-1789, at 60 (Melcher 1789), also cited in 5 N.H. Laws
122 (Metcalf 1916).
21 Conn. Pub. Acts 1848, ch. 49, at 48.
222 Me. Laws, ch. 118, § 17, at 618 (1821). The penalty was originally set at $300,
but when the provision reappeared in Mx. REv. STAT. ch. 25, § 89 (1840), it provided

for a maximum of $1,000.
28 Me. Laws 1958, ch. 844, § 88, at 855, as amended, ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. ch. 96,

§ 89 (Supp. 1968).
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In pioneer communities of the South and West the threat of the
private duel exerted a very appreciable influence on tort law.2 4 The
disturbing prevalence of this genteel brand of slaughter prompted
the legislature of Kentucky in 1839 to authorize a suit in trespass
by the widow and children of any person killed in a duel. Provision
was made for the recovery of vindictive damages against the assailant
and all other participants. 25 This statute remained in the law until
1942.26

Although the Kentucky anti-dueling act was the only measure
of its kind prior to the date of Lord Campbell's Act, death by

assault and violence continued to attract legislative attention thereafter. In 1855, only one year after the adoption of its first general
death statute, the Kentucky legislature made special provision for

the widow or heirs of any person killed 27 through the use of "the
weapons popularly known as colts, brass knuckles, slungshots, or
any imitation or substitute therefor." 2s

This measure authorized

the recovery of "such damages as a jury may deem right," including
a provision for imprisonment in the event of failure to satisfy the

judgment. 29 A modified version of this act is still in effect in
Kentucky.3 0
As early as 1854 a dueling statute similar to the Kentucky measure was passed by the legislature of Washington. 31 This enactment
was the first to deal with fatal accidents in that state, and it preceded

the Washington general death statute 2 by fifteen years. 33The Washington dueling measure continued in force until 1917.
2 In an effort to subordinate the desire for personal vengeance aroused by insults,
the legislatures of several southern states enacted anti-dueling statutes that authorized
an award of damages for insulting language calculated to lead to a breach of the
peace. See the discussion in Malone, Insult in Retaliation, 11 Mss. L.J. 333 (1939).
25 Ky. Acts 1838-39, ch. 1214, at 166 (1839), also cited in KY. DIG. STAT. LAws 572
(Loughborough 1842).
26 The duelling measure was omitted when the Kentucky general death statute was
revised in that year. KY. REv. STAT. §§ 411.130-.150 (1942).
27 1 Ky. Acts 1855, ch. 636, § 3, at 97 (1856).
28 1 Ky. Acts 1855, ch. 636, § 1, at 96 (1856).
29 1 Ky. Acts 1855, ch. 636, § 3, at 97 (1856).
80
Ky.REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.150 (1963).
In 1866 the statute was held unconstitutional for a defect in its title. O'Donoghue
v. Akin, 63 Ky. 47$ (1866). However, a substitute measure was enacted the same year
authorizing an award, including vindictive damages, to the widow and children for
death resulting from the careless, wanton, or malicious use of firearms or other deadly
weapons. Ky. Acts 1865-66, ch. 85, at '6 (1865). This act has never been repealed.
31Wash. Terr. Stat. 1854, § 496, at 220.
2 Wash. Terr. Stat. 1869, ch. 58, § 658, at 165.
"1 WVash. Laws 1917, ch. 123, § 4, at 495.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1965: 673

II
THE RAILWAY DEATH STATUTES
By the middle of the nineteenth century we find legislative
attention suddenly arrested by the effusion of human tragedy brought
about by the emergence and rapid growth of the steam railway.
As we shall see, the influence of the transportation age on death
legislation was enormous. Injuries and deaths suddenly multiplied
at an alarming pace.34 The legislatures moved into action in this
single field with surprising promptness and often with but little
notion of what legal theory, if any, would be appropriate to meet
the needs of bereaved families clamoring for assistance. From 1840
until 1887 sixteen states made special provision for death resulting
from railroad operations. Sometimes the railroads were singled out
specifically for legislative treatment, while at other times they were
included along with other public carriers, such as steamboats, ferries
and even stage coaches. Some of the measures awarded punitive
damages while others conferred a separate civil cause of action for the
benefit of the families. Some proceeded on a survival basis while
others merely authorized "a suit" by the personal representative with
spare direction as to the disposition of the proceeds of the judgment.
The prevalence of railroad statutes perhaps is attributable to the
bewildering novelty of the entire problem of corporate responsibility
for the negligence of agents and servants. What are now commonlyaccepted notions of respondeat superior were just then emerging as
a product of transportation and industrial accidents. The liability
of an employer for anything beyond those acts of employees which
the employer had personally directed was poorly understood. 5 The
modem conception of "scope of employment" was just then taking
shape,3 6 and was hemmed in by developing restrictive doctrines
"The illustrated newspapers in this period were continuously filled with illustrations and editorials on railroad accidents. "Accident broadsides" printed in lurid
colors found ready sale. See the interesting account in DUNBAR, A HIsroRY ov TRAVEL
IN AmEICA 1056-61 (new ed. 1937). Contemporary cartoons in scathing denunciation

of the indifference of railroad operators will be found in this volume at 1066, 1069,
1073.

(1956).

See also SiLcox, SAFETY IN EARLY AMERICAN RAILwAY OPERATIONS: 1853-1871

3r It was not until 1842 (only a decade prior to the period we are discussing) that
the English Court of Common Pleas made its first announcement that a corporation
could be held liable in trespass. Maund v. Monmouthshire Canal Co., 4 Man. & G.
452, 134 Eng. Rep. 186 (C.P. 1842). See the excellent discussion in BATY, VICAIUOUS
LIABILITY 65, (1916).

'6 See Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in
433, 453 (1934), also in STuvIEs IN ArENcY 129, 155 (1949).

HARVARD LEcAL ESSAYS
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such as the fellow servant rule, which was capturing the judicial
fancy during this period. Problems of corporate responsibility
were virtually synonymous with problems of railroad liability, and
it is little wonder that the early legislatures should believe express
provision for railroad liability was necessary.
The whole story of railroad death legislation is a complex one.
We will begin with the four states whose legislators attacked railroad
or carrier deaths before they made any effort to come forward with a
general death statute, and thereafter will turn to those states which
simultaneously provided a railroad death and general death measure.
A. Massachusetts
The first of the railroad death acts was the Massachusetts penal
measure of 1840. It afforded protection only for the families of
railroad passengers who were killed through the negligence of the
proprietors or the gross negligence of railroad employees. 7 However, through a process of accretion extending over nearly a half
century, the Massachusetts legislature expanded the benefit of death
protection against railroads to all victims who were not employees of
the carriers,38 and finally, in 1883, even to those workers 39 Street
railways were included as defendants in 1864,40 and by 1897 electric
and power companies had been brought within the fold. 41 This
legislative proliferation finally led to a comprehensive death measure
in 1898.42 But the initial Massachusetts scheme of directing penal
measures against specific dangerous enterprises has left its indelible
imprint upon the death law of that commonwealth. Even after the
comprehensive death provision of 1898 was enacted, the specific
provisions against carriers and public utilities continued to clutter
the statutes until a general legislative overhauling took place in
1958.4 3 The highway death measure previously referred to" still
remains on the books, and special restrictive provisions relating
87 Mass. Acts &=Resolves 1840, ch. 80, at 224.
8

8 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1853, ch. 414, at 622. See also Mass. Acts & Resolves 1871,
ch. 352, at 699 (death at crossings through failure to give statutory crossing signal).
11Mass. Acts & Resolves 1883, ch. 243, at 532.

"Mass.
't Mass.
"Mass.
"Mass.

Acts & Resolves 1864, ch. 229, §§ 37-38, at 166.
Acts 9=Resolves 1897, ch. 416, at 388.
Acts & Resolves 1898, ch. 565, at 724.
Acts & Resolves 1958, ch. 238, at 122, MAss. GE.N. LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2

(Supp. 1964).
"See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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exclusively to railroad deaths will be found even in the most
45
recent statutes.
More importantly, the original penal attack persists today in full
force in Massachusetts and must be taken into consideration in any
effort to understand the administration of the death provisions of
that state. Up until 1881 the penalty was imposed through a criminal proceeding instituted by indictment in the name of the commonwealth. 46 Even thereafter, when a civil remedy was given in
addition to the criminal proceeding, 47 it remained necessary to establish that the death of the victim was due to the gross negligence of
the defendant's servants whenever the claimant attempted to resort to
respondeat superior.48 The latter limitation was not removed until
1907; 49 and even today the statutes expressly require that damages
be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant or its servants or agents.50 In short, the spirit of the earliest
measure adopted by the colonial legislature in 1647 has exerted its
influence upon the Massachusetts law of today.
B. Maine
Although, as we have seen, 51 the legislatures of Maine and Arkansas had made prior provision for the survival of personal injury
claims, these measures received little attention in the earliest cases.
In 1848 the Maine legislature enacted a penal provision directed
specifically at the captain or person having charge of a steamboat or
locomotive whose operation resulted in the death of a passenger
through a boiler explosion."' The general tenor of this act suggests that it was probably directed against the then prevalent practice
of railroad and steamboat racing. Seven years thereafter a broader
statute imposed a fine of not less than 500 nor more than 5000 dollars
for the benefit of the families of all persons except railroad employees who, while in the exercise of reasonable care, were killed
through the gross negligence of a servant of the railroad. 3 Two
229, § 2 (Supp. 1964).
"6Mass. Acts & Resolves 1881, ch. 199, § 3, at 522.
"7Mass. Acts & Resolves 1886, ch. 140, at 117.
48 See, e.g., Hicks v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 164 Mass. 424, 41 N.E. 721 (1895).
,0 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1907, ch. 375, § 1, at 324; Mass. Acts & Resolves 1907, ch.
392, § 1, at 338.
"0 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1964).
45 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.

" See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
"2 Me. Acts & Resolves 1848, ch. 70, § 2, at 59.
58 Me. Acts & Resolves 1855, ch. 161, § 1, at 159.
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years later the requirement that the negligence be gross was
omitted.5 4 The substance of these measures remained on the statutes
until the enactment of a general death provision in 1891.55
C. Arkansas
The first groping of the Arkansas legislature toward a death
provision took the form of an ineptly-worded 1874 statute directed
at railroad deaths.5 6 This measure, unlike the statutes of Massachusetts and Maine, was not penal in character nor was it restricted to
death occasioned by the gross neglect of railroad employees. Although it is difficult to gather the meaning of the Arkansas legislature from the language of this measure, the supreme court of the
state proceeded by analogy to statutes in other jurisdictions modeled
after Lord Campbell's Act, and held that it authorized an award of
damages to a mother for loss of services arising from the death of
her child. 57 Eight years later, after the enactment of Arkansas' first
general death statute,58 the court of that state held that this latter
measure impliedly repealed the earlier railroad act. 59
D. New Hampshire
The final instance in which a special railroad statute preceded
any death measure of a general character occurred in New Hampshire. The legislature of that state in 1850, following the general
"1ME. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 42 (1857).
"Me. Acts & Resolves 1891, ch. 124, §§ 1-2, at 135.
"0"When any adult person be killed by railroad trains running in this State, the
husband may sue for damages to a wife. In all other cases the legal representative shall
sue.... When the person killed or wounded be a minor, the father, if living, if not,
then the mother, if neither be living, then the guardian may sue for and recover
such damages as the court or jury trying the case may assess." Ark. Acts 1874, § 3, at
133.
'5 Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350 (1878).
The court denied that
the cause of action was one that survived from the child to the mother, and hence
rejected the defendant's argument that there could be no recovery under the measure
for instantaneous death. Id. at 361. But it allowed damages for medical expenses,
which usually are allowed under survival statutes. Id. at 360, 362.
"sArk. Acts 1883, No. 53, at 75.
"'Davis v. St. Louis, I.Mt. & So. Ry., 53 Ark. 117, 124, 13 S.W. 801, 802 (1890). The
court, conceding that there was no express repeal of the earlier special act, refused to
admit the prospect of different legal consequences flowing from death, dependent upon
the fact that the killing was by a: railroad. As will be indicated subsequently, this
approach to a conflict between general and special death statutes has not generally
prevailed.
Despite the holding in Davis v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., supra, the railroad provision
persisted in its original form through several revisions of the death statute. Finally in
1961 all death references were stricken from the statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-1003
(Supp. 1963).
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Massachusetts pattern, enacted a penal measure imposing a fine for
death through railroad operations. 60 This was repealed twenty-nine
years later when the legislature enacted a general death act 1 which
led ultimately to the passage of New Hampshire's survival statute,
2
the prevailing measure for death today in that state.
III
THE DUAL COVERAGE DEATH AcTs

The states discussed above, which initiated their attack on the
fatal accident problem by singling out railroad deaths for exclusive
treatment, gradually gave up this approach and adopted general
statutes of one type or another. As a result, the courts in these
jurisdictions were spared the embarrassing difficulty involved in dealing with overlapping and frequently conflicting statutory remedies
for deaths. This, however, was not to be true in ten other jurisdictions whose legislatures attempted to remedy deaths occasioned
by railroad operations and those resulting from all other tortious
conduct through separate and distinct provisions in a single,
combination-type measure. Such was the initial situation in Kentucky, Rhode Island, North Carolina, Missouri, Colorado, New
Mexico, Texas, Arizona, and both Dakotas. In most of these states
the facts necessary to establish a cause of action for death resulting
from the operation of a railroad differed in one or more important
respects from the showing required by the same statute to recover for
fatal injuries caused by other defendants. Often the beneficiaries
designated by the railroad death provision were different from those
who were entitled to recover under the general death section.
Frequently the entire theory of recovery as well as the scheme for
assessing damages depended solely upon the fortuitous circumstance
60 N.H. Laws 1850, ch. 953, § 7, at 928. This original statute unlike the Massachusetts measure, included death occasioned by the "gross negligence or by the carelessness
of [railroad] . . . servants or agents .... ." (Emphasis added.) The Massachusetts

statute provided only for "the unfitness or gross negligence or carelessness of [railroad] ... servants or agents .... " Mass. Acts & Resolves 1840, ch. 80, at 224. This
slight but significant change in phraseology in a statute which otherwise slavishly
tracks the Massachusetts act clearly indicates a legislative intention to cover death by
ordinary as well as gross negligence on the part of railroad employees. When, however,
this measure was incorporated into N.H. GEN. STAT. 1867, ch. 264, § 14, the phraseology
of the Massachusetts statute was substituted.
61 N.H. Laws 1879, ch. 35, at 353.
02

N.H. Laws 1887, ch. 71, at 454, as amended, N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§556:11-

556:14 (1955), as amended, N.H. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 556:13 (Supp. 1963).
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that the death was caused by a railroad rather than some other wrongdoer.
We can only surmise as to why a legislature would deliberately
adopt a dual treatment of this kind, and conjecture is made all
the more difficult by the marked dissimilarities prevailing among
the various statutes in this group.
One possible explanation stems from the observation that the
state legislatures of this period, deprived of any common law principle to assist them in developing a remedy for wrongful death,
might be expected to seek out a precedent from the statutes of other
jurisdictions. At the inception of the movement toward dual coverage in 1853, the legislatures of the two most influential statesMassachusetts and New York-had already approached the death
problem in contradictory fashion. The Massachusetts lawmakers
of 1840 had adopted a penal attack restricted to railroad deaths, 63
while in New York the legislature in 1847 had faithfully followed
the comprehensive model of England's Lord Campbell's Act.64 The
sudden urgency of the problem of accidental death caused the legislatures of the remaining states to be faced with a choice between
two opposed theories, both of which were virtually untried. It is
not surprising that debates in the legislative halls would lead in
some instances to the ill-advised but cautious conclusion that both
attacks should be adopted in combination.
The attractiveness of an approach that would include a specific
attack upon death resulting from the negligence of railroad employees was probably enhanced by the bewildering problem of
respondeat superior, discussed above. 65 The legislature of Massachusetts had expressly restricted railroadliability for death to instances
where the servants or agents were chargeable with gross neglect
or where they were selected with knowledge of their unfitness. 66
It was entirely predictable that several states would follow the
Massachusetts example.
Above all, there must be taken into account the sharply conflicting polices that competed in influencing the legislators of that

00 Mass.

Acts & Resolves 1840, ch. 80, at 224; see text accompanying notes 37-50

supra.

6,2

N.Y. Laws 1847, ch. 450, at 575.
Or See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.

00 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1840, ch. 80, at 224; see note 37 supra and accompanying

text.
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period. The sorry spectacle of mass slaughter on the rails impelled
the lawmakers toward drastic action, while the recognized need to
encourage transportation activity without prohibitive cost strongly
suggested caution and restraint in dealing with railroad accidents.
It is hardly a matter for surprise that in some instances the railroads
were given preferential treatment, while in other respects they fell
under a harsher hand than other defendants.
A. Kentucky
When the legislature of Kentucky adopted its fatal accident act
in 1854, the state's statute compensating the widows of the victims of
duelling had already been in effect for fifteen years. Hence, the
device of according legislative recognition to deaths occasioned
by specific activities was not unfamiliar in that state. The first section of the 1854 measure provided in substance that if the life of
any person other than a railroad employee were lost through the
negligence or carelessness of either the managers of a railroad or
of their servants or agents, the personal representative of the deceased could institute suit and recover damages "in the same manner
that the person himself might have done for any injury where death
did not ensue." 68 Although it is unclear whether this was intended as
a survival measure or as a recognition of an independent right in the
administrator to recover for the death, certainly the provision had
none of the characteristics of a penal measure.
However, the third section of the same statute, dealing with all
other wrongful deaths, betrayed an entirely different approach:
[I]f the life of any person or persons is lost or destroyed by the
willful neglect of another person or persons [or corporations] ...
their agents or servants, then the personal representative of the
deceased shall have the right to sue such person... and to recover
punitive damages for the loss or destruction of the life aforesaid.
(Emphasis added.) 69
Under these two measures, with their separate spheres of operation, the identity of the defendant determined whether the damages
were regarded as penal (i.e., measured by the culpability of the
67 Ky. Acts 1839, ch. 1214, at 166, also cited in Ky. DIG. STAT. LAWS tit. 108, § I
(Loughborough 1842); see text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
68 Act to Redress Injuries Arising from the Neglect or Misconduct of Railroad Companies, and Others, 1 Ky. Acts 1853-54, ch. 964, § 1, at 175 (1854).
69 1 Ky. Acts 1853-54, ch. 964, § 3, at 175 (1854).
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fatal act) or as compensatory.70 Damages were awarded for ordinary
negligence whenever the suit was against a railroad, while no claim
for death could be recognized against any other wrongdoer in the
absence of a showing of willful neglect. Moreover, the Kentucky
courts adopted the position that gross negligence could not be regarded as the equivalent of willful neglect under section 3.71 A
high tide of strict construction was reached when the Kentucky
Supreme Court denied a personal representative any right under
this section for a death caused by an intentional assault, since the
deliberate aggression by the defendant amounted to something more
than willful neglect. 72
The situation became more complex when the legislature of
Kentucky in 1873 made a seemingly trivial change in the general
death provision (section 3). In addition to the personal representative (who formerly was the only person entitled to sue under that
section), the widow or heirs were authorized to bring suit.7 3 No
corresponding change was made, however, in the provision for railroad deaths (section 1), and the cause of action here continued to
be vested solely in the personal representative. Following this
change the Kentucky Supreme Court gave an interpretation to the
amended section 3 that abetted the inconsistency.7 4 The 1873
amendment, said the court, served to restrict the right to maintain
"0The constitutionality of § 3 was sustained against an argument that its penal
character exposed the defendant to double punishment. Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2

Met.) 146, 149-53 (1859). However, despite the fact that willful neglect must be shown
under § 3, it was held erroneous to instruct the jury that it must return punitive
damages if willful neglect was found. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Brooks' Adm'x, 83 Ky.

129, 138-41 (1885).

71 Hansford's Adm'x v. Payne & Co., 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 380 (1875); Jacobs' Adm'r v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 263 (1874); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Filbern's
Adm'x, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 574 (1869) (willful neglect must involve either "intentional
wrong or such reckless disregard of security and right as to imply bad faith').
72 Spring's Adm'r v. Glenn, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 172 (1876). In partial justification of
this decision, it should be noted that decedent's wife could resort to the special
Kentucky statute authorizing a widow or heir to maintain suit for the death of a

husband who was killed through the malicious use of "fire-arms, or other deadly
weapons." Ky. Acts 1865-66, ch. 85, § 1,at 6 (1866) (replacing 1 Ky. Acts 1855, ch. 636,
at 96). Ifno such weapon were used, however, there was apparently no remedy for
intentional killing.
Cf. Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146, 149-50 (1859) (defendant aimed a gun at

A and killed B; suit properly instituted under § 3 of the death act for willful neglect,
rather than under the special firearm statute then prevailing).
7 Ky. GEN. STAT. ch. 57, § 3 (1873).
7"Henderson's Adm'r v. Kentucky Cent. R.R., 86 Ky. 389, 5 S.W. 875 (1887);
accord, Jordan's Adm'r v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. R.R., 89 Ky. 40, 11 S.W. 1013
(1889).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[VCol. 1965: 673

suit under that section to the widow and children. 75 While the personal representative retained the right to sue under the amended
statute, the court restricted that right to authority to sue only on
behalf of the widow and children. 76 It supported its conclusion with
the observation that the term "heirs" should be interpreted to mean
77
only children.
Therefore, unless there were a widow and/or children, no suit
under section 3 could be maintained. As a result, parents were
*denied all right to recover for the wrongful death of their children,
and a husband could not maintain an action for the death of his
wife. 78 If by chance, however, the defendant happened to be a railroad, the personal representative could proceed for damages under
section 1 without reference to the existence of any particular bene79
ficiary.
Further restrictive interpretations by the court were to follow.
The right to proceed exclusively under the railroad provision was
limited to instances where the wrongdoing amounted to something
less than willful neglect.80 Recall that damages under this section
were wholly compensatory in character, even if the representative
were in a position to establish gross negligence on the part of the
railroad or its employees. If the representative should attempt to
secure an award of punitive damages by alleging that the railroad was
guilty of willful neglect, he would find that his claim had become
qualified exclusively under the general death provision, and his suit
was subject to dismissal unless the existence of a widow or children
81
could be established.
The artificialities of the Kentucky statute and the effect of the
inconsistencies between its two provisions were heightened by the
5 86 Ky. at 394-95, 5 S.W. at 877.

76 86 Ky. at 395, 5 S.W. at 877.
7

Ibid.

78 Lexington City Ry. v. Kayse, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 321 (Super. Ct. 1888); Kentucky

Cent. R.R. v. McGuinty, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 860 (Super. Ct. 1888).
72 Owensboro & N. Ry. v. Barclay's Adm'r, 102 Ky. 16, 43 S.W. 177 (1897); Givens
v. Kentucky Cent. Ry., 89 Ky. 231, 12 S.W. 257 (1889); cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. McElvain, 98 Ky. 700, 34 S.W. 236 (1896); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Morris, 14 Ky. L. Rep.
466, 20 S.W. 539 (Ct. App. 1892).
go Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Prewitt's Adm'r, 92 Ky. 223, 17 S.W. 484
(1891); Givens v. Kentucky Cent. Ry., 89 Ky. 231, 233-34, 12 S.W. 257, 258 (1889).
81 Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Prewitt's Adm'r, 92 Ky. 223, 17 S.W. 484
(1891); Baker's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.R.R., 13 Ky. L. Rep. 465, 17 S.W. 191 (Ct. App.
1891).
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court's persistent refusal to recognize its earlier survival statute82
in any case in which damages under either section of the death act
presently under discussion were sought. The claimant was forced
to elect whether to proceed under the survival statute or under the
applicable death act. 3 Even the common law right of the husband to
recover for the loss of his wife's services from the time of injury until
her death, which has seldom been questioned elsewhere, was denied
by the courts of Kentucky whenever the facts showed that a suit could
be maintained under the new death statute.8 4 This unhappy state
of affairs under the dual coverage provisions continued until the
people of the state in 1891 approved an amendment to the Kentucky
Constitution providing a single death measure modeled after the
familiar Lord Campbell's Act. 5
B. Rhode Island
In 1853, one year earlier than the date of enactment of the
Kentucky measure, the Rhode Island legislature adopted a single
statute that similarly attempted to deal separately with carrierinflicted deaths and deaths caused by the misconduct of other de82 Ky. Acts 1811, ch. 375, §5, at 182 (1812), also cited in 1 Ky. Dic. STAT. LAW
88 (Morehead & Brown 1834); see note 7 supra and accompanying text. The Kentucky provision of 1812 was the earliest legislative measure in the Anglo-American
world to recognize the survival of personal injury claims. The statute, however,
received little judicial interpretation until after the effective date of the death statute.
In 1872 the court construed the survival provision in a manner which deprived it of
all significance in cases where the accident was fatal, by observing, "the common
law conferred no right of action for an injury resulting in the loss of life, and the
statute referred to, being merely declaratory of the common law, gives no right of
action to the personal representative when the intestate himself had none." Louisville
& Portland Canal Co. v. Murphy, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 522, 534 (1872); see Louisville, C.
& L.R.R. v. Case's Adm'r, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 728 (1873). Two years later, however, the
court reptidiated this interpretation and recognized that the statute allowed survival
for fatal injuries except where death was instantaneous. Hansford's Adm'x v. Payne
& Co., 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 380 (1875).
13 Conner's Adm'x v. Paul, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 144 (1876). In Hackett v. Louisville,
St. L. & Tex. Pac. Ky., 95 Ky. 236, 24 S.W. 871 (1894), a father, suing as administrator
under the death act, included a count in the alternative for pain and suffering between time of accident and death. The court held that even though the parent had
no standing to sue under the death act because of the absence of widow or child, his
effort to recover under the act constituted an election that deprived him of all right
to sue on a survivorship theory thereafter. See Evans, Death by Wrongful ActSurvivorship of Tort Actions in Kentucky, 21 Ky. L.J. 369, 382-83 (1933).
84Louisville & N.R.R. v. McElwain, 98 Ky. 700, 34 S.W. 236 (1896).
85 Ky. CONST. § 241.
The debates of the constitutional convention betray the
public dissatisfaction with the Kentucky decisions which restricted recovery under the
1873 amendment to the general death provision to instances where there was a
surviving wife or child. 4 KENTUCKY CONSTrrTUMONAL DEBATES 4715-20 (1890). The
constitutional provision was implemented by Ky. Acts 1893, ch. 252, §§ 3-6, 10, at 1383.
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fendants.80 As originally enacted, section 1, the provision directed
against carriers, covered only the deaths of passengers and persons
in the care of the defendant. In 1855, however, families of highway users 7 killed through the operation of trains were included.88
Furthermore, the original carrier enactment provided that unless
the death was attributable to the personal default of the proprietors
themselves, it had to be shown that the fatality was caused by the
gross negligence or carelessness of railroad agents and servants,80
but the 1855 amendment also eliminated this requirement. 0
Again, however, as in Kentucky, a different scheme was established where the death was attributable to a defendant other than a
carrier. Section 6 of the original enactment authorized a suit "in
all cases where the death of any person ensues from injury inflicted
"...-91
(Emphasis added.) The
by the wrongful act of another .
Rhode Island Supreme Court noted the difference in phraseology
between this section and the carrier section. Accordingly, it denied
recovery to the parents of a child who was killed when it fell into
a cistern that had been left uncovered through the carelessness of
the defendant; the death, said the court, was due merely to a wrongful
omission.9 2 The opinion observed that the term "wrongful act"
in the general section might appropriately be interpreted as including any negligent misconduct if it were not for the fact that
in the railroad section the words "negligence or carelessness" appeared without qualification.9 3 This distinction between act and
omission persisted in the Rhode Island decisions whenever the death
94
claim was against some defendant other than a carrier.
In several respects the Rhode Island statute marked an advance
over the Kentucky measure. A single theory of wrongful death
R.I. Acts & Resolves 1853, Oct. Sess., §§ 1-6, at 257.
"Highway" was interpreted to include navigable waters so the act would include
the occupant of a sailboat who was killed through the negligent operation of a steamboat on open waters. Chase v. American Steamboat Co., 10 R.I. 79 (1871), aff'd on
88

7

other grounds, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872).
88 R.I. Acts & Resolves 1855, Jan. Sess., § 8, at 15, also cited in R.I. REV.
176, § 16 (1857).
88 R.I. Acts & Resolves 1853, Oct. Sess., § 1, at 257.
80 R.I. Acts & Resolves 1855, Jan. Sess., § 8, at 15, also cited in R.I. REV.
176, § 16 (1857).
9"R.I. Acts & Resolves 1853, Oct. Sess., § 6, at 258.
82 Bradbury v. Furlong, 13 R.I. 15 (1880).
3

8

STAT.

ch.

STAT. ch.

I
ld.
at 16-17.

'Myette v. Gross, 18 R.I. 729, 30 Atl. 602 (1894) (decedent killed due to employer's
neglect to shore up roof of mines).
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prevailed under both sections and the beneficiaries were the same
persons irrespective of whether the suit was against a carrier or some
other wrongdoer. However, with respect to survivorship, the Rhode
Island courts adopted a position even more conservative than that of
Kentucky. The legislature in 1855 had provided unequivocally
for the survival of all personal injury claims.9 5 In Kentucky, a
plaintiff was allowed to elect whether to proceed under the death or
survival statute where both might apply. 96 The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, however, relying largely upon English decisions that
dealt solely with survival at common law, held that the survival
statute applied only to non-fatal injuries where the victim died from
some extraneous cause. 97 In consequence, all death claims fell within
the exclusive domain of the death statute with its dual coverage.
This latter measure was ultimately repealed by the Judiciary Act of
1893 and a single comprehensive statute based upon Lord Campbell's
Act was substituted therefor.98
C. North Carolina
There is a striking similarity between the Rhode Island statute
of 1853 and North Carolina's first death act, adopted in 1854.99
Under both measures the railroad defendant was made liable for
death resulting from either the acts or omissions of the proprietor
or his servants, while other defendants were responsible only for
the fatal consequences of affirmative acts. In the case of Rhode
Island one might suspect at first that this distinction was the result
of indifferent draftsmanship. But an examination of the language
0 R.I. REV. STAT. ch. 176, § 10 (1857). Under this provision causes of action in
both trespass and trespass on the case survived, indicating an intention to provide for
survival of omissions as well as of acts.
This same bill also amended the death act. See notes 88 and 90 supra and accompanying text.
Rhode Island had previously provided for survival of claims for assault and battery.
See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
08 See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
07 Lubrano v. Atlantic Mills, 19 R.I. 129, 32 At. 205 (1895). This position has
been adopted in two other jurisdictions, Illinois and Kansas. Holton v. Daly, 106
Il1. 181, 136 (1882); McCarthy v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 18 Kan. 46, 52 (1877). The
same view prevailed for a short time in Kentucky, Hansford's Adm'x v. Payne & Co.,
74 Ky. (11 Bush) 380 (1875), but was later rejected in favor of an election theory,
Hackett v. Louisville, St. L. & Tex. Pac. Ry., 95 Ky. 236, 24 S.W. 871 (1894).
0
8 R.I. Judiciary Act of 1893, ch. 13, § 14, at 71, also cited in R.I. GEN. LAWS 1896,
ch. 233, § 14.
00 N.C. Pub. Laws 1854-55, ch. 39, §§ 1-4, at 97, also cited in N.C. Rv. CoDE ch. 1,
§§ 8.11 (1854).
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of the North Carolina statute (which, in general terms, tracks Lord
Campbell's Act in both its provisions) can leave no doubt that the
difference between the two sections was deliberate. 100 The seemingly unaccountable distinction drawn in these two states between
acts and omissions was probably a by-product of the gradual emergence of negligence law from the older notions of trespass, assumpsit,
and case, which was still taking place at that time. This seems particularly clear from the original Rhode Island statute, which protected the lives of passengers and of persons "in the care of" the railroad proprietors. 10 1 The existence of an affirmative undertaking to
carry safely smacks of the concept of assumpsit, and corporate responsibility seems entirely appropriate. 102 But apart from some specific undertaking such as this, the desirability of imposing a general
affirmative duty of care had not become sufficiently obvious to
attract the attenton of the lawmakers in these states. Consequently,
where assumpsit was missing the legislatures felt there must be a
trespass-a wrongful act-before liability for death should attach.103
Thus, the distinction between the requirements of the two provisions seems to stem from the fragmentary view on negligence
which prevailed at that time, rather than from any desire to single
out carriers for harsher treatment than other defendants.
Unfortunately (but only for the historian) there are no sig100 The applicable sections of the North Carolina statute read as follows:
"Sec. 1. . . . whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the negligence
or default of any railroad or steamboat company, or of any steamboat or stagecoach
proprietor, in this State, and the neglect or default is such as would have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, if
death had not ensucd [sic], then and in every such case, the corporation which would
have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured.
"Sec. 2. . . . whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act
of another person, and the wrongful act is such as would have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action, and recover damages in respect thereof, if death had
not ensued, then and in every such case, the person who would have been liable, if
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under
such circumstances as amount in law to felony." N.C. Pub. Laws 1854-55, ch. 39,
§§ 1-2, at 97.
Both sections follow the language of Lord Campbell's Act almost verbatim, except
that the English statute refers throughout to "wrongful act, neglect, or default."
While the first section quoted above retains this concept, the second section conspicuously abandons it.
101R.I. Acts & Resolves 1853, Oct. Sess., § 1, at 257.
102BOHLEN, The Basis of Affirmative Obllgatlions in the Law of Tort, in STUDIES
IN THE LAW OF TORTS 33, 38-39 (1926); PROSSER, TORTS § 54, at 334 (3d cd. 1964).
103 Ibid.
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nificant decisions under the North Carolina statute of 1854.

The

measure was superseded in 1868 by a single provision similar to
Lord Campbell's Act. 04
D. Missouri, Colorado, and New Mexico

The contradictions and inconsistencies discovered in the dual
coverage acts of Kentucky, Rhode Island and North Carolina are
all found again in novel rearrangement in the Missouri death statute

of 1855.105 This act, with its treatment of carriers' 016 separate from
other defendants in death cases, is of particular interest because it

served as the model for two other states-Colorado 107 and New
Mexico. 10 8 For Missouri and New Mexico the measure represented

the first effort to deal with death claims. In Colorado, on the other
hand, the legislature had enacted a general death statute similar to
Lord Campbell's Act in 1872,1o9 but it unaccountably abandoned this

measure in 1877 and substituted the Missouri statute with only slight
modification. 110

It was not until 1955 that the Missouri legislature

moved to a general death act,"' and the original statutes, with some
changes, still remain in effect in both Colorado 1 2 and New Mexico." 3
101 N.C. Laws 1868-69, ch. 113, §§ 70-72, at 276 (1869).
"0 Mo. REv. STAT. 1854-55, ch. 51, §§ 2-4 (1855). For the text of the carrier provision of this statute see note 117 infra.
101The carrier provision of the original Missouri statute included "locomotive, car
or train of cars," "steamboat, or any of the machinery thereof," and "stage-coach, or
other public conveyance." Mo. RIv. STAT. 1854-55, ch. 51, § 2 (1855).
Although the Missouri court interpreted the section as including public motor
carriers, Higgins v. St. Louis & Suburban Ry., 197 Mo. 300, 95 S.W. 863 (1906), the
legislature removed any doubt by making express reference to motor vehicles when
the measure was amended in 1905. Mo. Laws 1905, § 1, at 135.
The original New Mexico and Colorado provisions (which, in this respect, are
the same today) were copied verbatim from the Missouri statute, except that steamboats were appropriately excluded in these states. Both public motor cars and street
railways were later included through judiclal interpretation in New Mexico. Sanchez
v. Contract Trucking Co., 45 N.M. 506, 117 P.2d 815 (1941). Street railways were
also brought within the coverage of the carrier provision in Colorado. Friedrichs v.
Denver Tramway Corp., 93 Colo. 539, 27 P.2d 497 (1933).
The Colorado and Missouri courts have held that "public conveyance" includes
elevators in public buildings. Davis v. Colorado Sav. Bank, 78 Colo. 509, 242 Pac. 985
(1926); Williams v. Short, 219 Mo. App. 99, 268 S.W. 706 (1925).
107 COLO. GEN. LAws 1877, ch. 25, §§ 877-81.
108 N.M. Coise'. LAws 1884, tit. 33, ch. 23, §§ 2308-16.
10 Colo. Terr. Laws 1872, § 1, at 117.
110 See note 107 supra.
111 Mo. Laws 1955, § 1,

(Supp. 1964).

at 778, Mo.

112 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 1963,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-20-1,

118

(Supp. 1965).

ANN. STAT.

§§ 537.080, 537.085, 537.090, 537.100

§§ 41-1-1-41-1-4.
22-20-3 (1953), N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 22-20-2, 22-20-4

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

(VCol. 1965: 673

1. Difference Between Sections in Amount of Award
The Missouri act, which will be referred to as the Missouri
Model, shares with the Kentucky statute the approach of a combined penal measure and death act, but it reverses the Kentucky
scheme. It is that portion of the Missouri Model dealing exclusively
with deaths caused by the misconduct of carriers that makes provision for an award of punitive damages without proof of loss, while
the general death section of the same statute provides for a compensatory award to designated beneficiaries. The amounts recoverable under the early various provisions are shown in the following
4
table:"
Carrier
deaths
Other deaths

Missouri
$5,000 penalty
Pecuniary loss
(Max. limit of
$5,000)

New Mexico
Colorado
$3,000-$5,000 penalty $5,000 penalty
Pecuniary loss
(Max. limit of
$5,000)

Pecuniary loss
(No max. limit)

As the table clearly shows, it would be to the plaintiff's advantage
to seek the carrier recovery: (1) in Missouri, in every case; (2) in
Colorado, whenever it was likely that pecuniary loss to beneficaries
was less than 3,000 dollars; (3) in New Mexico, whenever it was
likely that pecuniary loss to beneficiaries was less than 5,000 dollars." 5 For this reason limitations on the availability of the penal
carrier measure were brought into sharp focus from the start.
2. Restrictions on Resort to One Section or the Other
In considering the strictures on the right to resort to the carrier
provision of the Missouri Model, it may be recalled that in Kentucky, Rhode Island and North Carolina the representative of any
person who met his death by reason of railroad operations was
entitled to the benefits of the section directed against carriers." 0
We have seen that the difficulty encountered in those states related
solely to the limited availability of the general death provision.
L4Mo. REv. STAT. 1854-55, ch. 51, §§ 2-4 (1855); N.M. COMP. LAws 1884, tit. 33,
ch. 23, §§ 2308-10, amended by N.M. Laws 1891, ch. 49, § 2; COLO. GEN. LAWs 1877,
ch. 25, §§ 877-79.
(recovery by
115 See, e.g., Clint v. Stolworthy, 144 Colo. 597, 557 P.2d 649 (1960)
child who was unable to show pecuniary loss); Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Frederic, 57
Colo. 90, 140 Pac. 463 (1914) (under penal statute, earnings of deceased were immaterial).
116
See sections A, B, C supra.
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The Missouri Model reversed this approach. The general death
provision was a comprehensive measure modeled after Lord Campbell's Act. It was only when a claimant sought to enjoy the benefit
of the arbitrary penal award under the carrier provision that he
encountered difficulties. It is clear from the provisions of this
section" 7 that a recovery for death due solely to a negligent defect
or insufficiency in the vehicle or its machinery could not be allowed
unless the claim was on behalf of a deceased passenger."18 In the
case of all other victims of fatal accidents caused by carrier fault, the
claimant was obliged to show that the death resulted from the negligence, unskillfulness or criminal intent of an officer or employee
who was engaged in actively running, conducting, or managing the
conveyance."19 The courts in Missouri, Colorado and New Mexico
117 "Sec. 2.-Whenever any person shall die from any injury, resulting from, or
occasioned by, the negligence, unskillfulness or criminal intent, of any officer, agent,
servant or employee, whilst running, conducting or managing any locomotive, car or
train of cars; or of any master, pilot, engineer, agent or employee, whilst running,
conducting or managing any steamboat, or any of the machinery thereof; or of any
driver of any stage-coach, or other public conveyance, whilst in charge of the same
as a driver; and when any passenger shall die from any injury, resulting from, or
occasioned by, any defect or insufficiency in any railroad, or any part thereof; or in
any locomotive or car; or in any steamboat or the machinery thereof; or in any stagecoach, or other public conveyance, the corporation, individual or individuals, in whose
employ any such officer, agent, servant, employee, master, pilot, engineer or driver,
shall be, at the time such injury is committed, or who owns any such railroad,
locomotive, car, stage-coach or other public conveyance, at the time any injury is
received, resulting from or occasioned by any defect or insufficiency above declared,
shall forfeit and pay for every person or passenger so dying, the sum of five thousand
dollars, which may be sued for, and recovered: First, By the husband or wife of the
deceased; or, Second, If there be no husband or wife, or he or she fails to sue within
.six months after such death, then by the minor child or children of the deceased; or,
Third, If such deceased be a minor and unmarried, then by the father and mother,
who may join in the suit, and each shall have an equal interest in the judgment; or
if either of them be dead, then by the survivor. In suits instituted under this section
it shall be competent for the defendant, for his defence, to show that the defect or
insufficiency named in this section, was not of a negligent defect or insufficiency." Mo.
Rav. STAT. 1854-55, ch. 51, § 2 (1855) (emphasis added). The New Mexico and Colorado provisions, supra notes 107, 108, were similar.
lf
The language of the original section, supra note 117, suggests that recovery for
the death of a passenger could not be allowed unless the fatal accident was due to
defective machinery or equipment, thus excluding passenger deaths caused by the
active negligence of railroad employees. This was later corrected by amendment.
Mo. Laws 1885, § 1, at 153.
li0 The Missouri legislature drew the same distinction between active and passive
negligence that had been drawn by the legislatures of Rhode Island and North Carolina. In the latter states the distinction placed the carrier provision in conflict with
the general death provision. See text accompanying notes 91-94 and following note
99 supra. Under the Missouri Model the distinction is drawn within the carrier provision itself and served to separate the rights of passengers from those of other
persons killed through railroad operations. Such justification as there may be for the
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consistently accorded this measure a strict interpretation. The families of railroad employees (who could not qualify as passengers) were
consistently denied the benefits of the penal provision whenever the
worker's death was attributable to defective rails, machinery or
equipment. 20 Claims on behalf of highway users killed at railroad
intersections received similar treatment: If the death of the victim
of such an accident could be charged to the inattention of the engineer or other railroad employee, a recovery of the fixed penal sum
might be forthcoming. 121 If, however, the accident were caused by
a negligent failure on the part of the carrier to provide an adequate
view of the tracks122 or to supply a sufficient number of watchmen, 12
the suit, if maintainable at all, had to be prosecuted under the
general death provision. Furthermore, in order to recover under
the penal section it was essential to show that the death was chargeable to some risk that arose out of the operation of a public vehicle;
the death of a pedestrian by electrocution due to a failure of the
employees of an electric street railway to remove a fallen trolley
24
wire could not give rise to a suit under this section.
The respective advantages and disadvantages ensuing from resort
to one section or the other of the Missouri Model were more obvious
under the New Mexico version of the statute than in Missouri
itself. Although the original penal railroad section in New Mexico
basic distinction is probably the same for all three states-the undeveloped state of
negligence law at that time, with its requirement of a specific undertaking whenever
the alleged default was a mere failure to affirmatively make conditions same. See text
accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
120 Holmes
v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 69 Mo. 536 (1879); Elliott v. St. Louis &
I.M.R.R., 67 Mo. 272 (1878). The same result followed where the deceased employee
was off duty and riding gratuitously. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Headland, 18 Colo.
477, 33 Pac. 185 (1893); Higgins v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 36 Mo. 418 (1865).
12, Potter v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 136 Mo. App. 125, 117 S.W. 593 (1909) (engineer
failed to keep lookout for persons on track); cf. Becke v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 102 Mo.
544,1213 S.W. 1053 (1890) (engineer failed to have headlight burning).
2 Rapp v. St. Joseph & I.R.R., 106 Mo. 423, 17 S.W. 487 (1891)
(high weed growth
obstructed view of tracks); Crumpley v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 98 Mo. 34, 11 S.W. 244
(1889) (suit under penal statute must be dismissed unless failure to give signal was
cause).
123Culbertson v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 140 Mo. 35, 36 S.W. 834 (1896).
124Steyer v. United Rys., 185 S.W. 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916).
In at least one Missouri decision the court accorded the term "cause" a highly
artificial meaning. A seriously wounded person was accepted as a passenger and died
while being negligently handled. The court observed that his death was not caused
by the operation of the train, within the meaning of the penal provision, since the
wound was of a mortal character. Jackson v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 87 Mo. 422
(1885).
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authorized a flat award of 5,000 dollars, 125 the general death provision in that state, unlike its counterparts in Missouri and Colorado, was not subjected to any maximum limit.128 In this state,
therefore, a claimant would frequently find that it was to his advantage verdict-wise to avoid the penal provision rather than to seek
its protection as in the other two states. 12 7 The courts of New Mexico, however, regarded the carrier provision as the exclusive remedy
for all fatal accidents falling within its coverage.128

The contrast

between the remedies available became a matter of even greater
moment when the New Mexico court later held that public motor
vehicles, as well as trains, were embraced within the carrier provision. 129 The result was highly confusing. Unlimited compensatory damages were available to the dependents of a pedestrian whose
death was chargeable to carelessness on the part of the operator
of a private automobile, 130 while there was a maximum limitation
whenever the offending vehicle happened to be a taxicab or motorbus. 131 The unfortunate families of passengers killed in cabs and
32
buses encountered the same difficulty.
3. Avoiding the Restrictions
One attempt to escape these restrictions was inspired by an
amendment to the Missouri railroad section in 1905, which eliminated the arbitrary award of 5,000 dollars and, following the
original Colorado pattern, vested the jury with discretion to impose
a penalty of not less than 2,000 nor more than 10,000 dollars. 33
Thereafter, the contention was made that the Missouri statute retained its penal character only in the sense that 2,000 dollars was always available without respect to proof of loss by the beneficiaries,
1

22 N.M. CoMP. LAWs 1884, tit. 33, ch. 23,

§ 2308.

N.M. COMP. LAWs 1884, tit. 33, ch. 23, § 2310, amended by N.M. Laws 1891,
ch. 49, § 2; see table accompanying note 114 supra.
127 See text accompanying note 115 supra.
128 E.g., Mallory v. Pioneer Southwestern Stages, Inc., 54 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1931).
129
Sanchez v. Contract Trucking Co., 45 N.M. 506, 117 P.2d 815 (1941).
10 Cf. White v. Montoya, 46 N.M. 241, 126 P.2d 471 (1942), where the negligent
driver was operating as an individual public carrier. He was, therefore, neither an
officer or agent, as required by the language of the penal section; hence suit under the
general death provision was appropriate.
121 N.M. Laws 1882, ch. 61, § 1, also cited in N.M. STAT. ANN. 1929, § 36-101; see
De Soto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1932).
1L2 N.M. Laws 1882, ch. 61, § 1, also cited in N.M. STAT. ANN. 1929, § 36-101; see
Mallory v. Pioneer Southwestern Stages, Inc., 54 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1931).
128 Mo. Laws 1905, § 1, at 137.
'-"
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but that recovery above this figure was purely compensatory and
rested upon proof of actual loss as under the general death provision,
rather than upon the degree of culpability of the defendant. This
argument was rejected; the Missouri court held that the carrier
14
section remained punitive despite the amendment.
Some of the restrictions and distinctions were subsequently
alleviated. In Missouri the technicalities surrounding the carrier
provision in practice did not operate to the serious disadvantage of
most families of death victims: The general death provision was
available and the courts manifested great liberality with respect to
proof of pecuniary loss. 83

Moreover, punitive damages were re-

coverable under the general death provision upon a showing of gross
36
negligence.
New Mexico made successive increases in the penal amount to be
awarded under the carrier provision, 8 7 and ultimately the legislature
in 1955 abandoned the penalty approach entirely and substituted
an award of such compensatory and exemplary damages as the jury
might deem fair and just. 8 8

Under the present carrier section

as thus amended, the damages appear to be assessed on the same
basis as is provided by the general death measure.
4. Problems of Beneficiaries in New Mexico
Other complications with respect to the two competing provisions of the New Mexico statute followed as the aftermath of an
amendment to the general death provision in 1891. Up until that
time the beneficiaries and parties entitled to sue under both provisions of the act were the same, but the 1891 amendment made
separate provision for the beneficaries entitled to recover under
the general death section.8 9 Included here as eligible claimants,
among others, were the dependent parents of an adult unmarried
child. No corresponding change, however, was made in the penal
provision, and recovery under this latter section continued to be
Is Grier v. Kansas City, C.C. & St. J. Ry., 286 Mo. 523, 228 S.W. 454 (1921); see
Young
v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 227 Mo. 307, 127 S.W. 19 (1910).
1

3r Russell, Measure of Damages Under Missouri Wrongful Death Act, 15 Mo. L.

REv. 31 (1950). In 1945 the maximum recovery under the general death provision was
finally increased to $15,000. Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 537.090 (1959).
136 Gray v. McDonald, 104 Mo. 303, 16 S.V. 398 (1891).
18 The penalty was increased to $7,500 in 1931, N.M. Laws 1931, ch. 19, § 1, at 39,
and to $10,000 in 1947, N.M. Laws 1947, ch. 125, § 1, at 213.
138 N.M. Laws 1955, ch. 270, § 1, at 727, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-4 (Supp. 1965).
281

N.M. Laws 1891, ch. 49, § 2, at 101.
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restricted to parents of minor children, who were entitled to services.
As a consequence of this inconsistency, the dependent parents of an
adult bus passenger were denied recovery when the latter was killed
as the result of the negligent operation of the vehicle. 140 The
action would have been sustained under the general death measure
if the victim had lost his life through carelessness of a private
motorist. This state of affairs continued until 1947 when the carrier
measure was finally amended to authorize suit by the personal representative even in the absence of any designated beneficiary. 141 Since
damages are also now assessed on the same basis for both the railroad
and general death provisions, 42 it appears to be irrelevant in all
respects whether a claim is prosecuted under the carrier measure or
under the general death statute, and hence the continued retention
of the carrier provision in New Mexico is difficult to explain.
E. Texas
Of all the variations on the dual coverage theme, the Texas
statute 48 involved the most serious complications for the families of
death victims. This measure, which later was copied by the legislature of Arizona 44 and prevailed in that state for more than a
decade,' 4r will be referred to as the Texas Model. As originally
enacted in 1860, the staute covered in a single section both deaths
occasioned by the operations of carriers and those caused by the
wrongdoing of other defendants:
If the life of any person is lost by reason of the negligence or
carelessness of the proprietor or proprietors, owner, charterer or
hirer of any railroad, steamboat, stage-coach, or other vehicle for
the conveyance of goods or passengers, or by the unfitness, gross

110Mallory

v. Pioneer Southwestern Stages, Inc., 54 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1931).
Similarly, suit under the penal section had to be instituted by the individual beneficiary, while an action under the general death provision could be maintained by
the personal representative. If the personal representative brought a penal action,
the suit might be dismissed, e.g., Sanchez v. Contract Trucking Co., 45 N.M. 506, 117
P.2d 815 (1941); cf. Cain v. Bowlby, 114 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1940) (penal recovery
allowed to wife who was personal representative because of her additional status as
beneficiary).
141 N.M. Laws 1947, ch. 125, § 1, at 213, as amended, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-4

(Supp. 1965).

142See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
143

Tex. Gen. Laws 1860, ch. 35, at 32. See the exhaustive discussion in Green, The
Texas
Death Act, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 133 (1947).
1 44
Am. REV. STAT. 1887, §§ 2145-55.
'15The original statute was superseded by ARIZ. REv. STAT. 1901, §§ 2764-66.
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negligence or carelessness of their servants or agents, and whensoever the death of a person may be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
unskilfulness or default, and the act, neglect, unskilfulness or
default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled
the party, injured, to maintain an action for such injury, then and
in every such case the person who would have been liable if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount,
in law, to a felony. 146
Following this dual coverage measure was a section that designated the eligible beneficiaries and outlined the procedures to be
followed in suits under the statute. These were the same in all particulars irrespective of whether the claim was asserted against a carrier or against some other defendant. The damages to be recovered
in all instances were measured in terms of the losses to the surviving members of the family, following in this respect the approach
147
of Lord Campbell's Act.
It will be observed from the language of the original Texas
Model that although the measure was not penal in character, the
provision for deaths occasioned by the misconduct of carrier employees required that gross negligence be established. In this respect
the Texas Model followed the approach of Massachusetts and other
New England states. 48 The Texas legislature, however, changed
this provision in 1887 to allow recovery for ordinary negligence on
the part of carrier employees14 0-a modification that was not effected
in Massachusetts until 1907.150 Following this change, a Texas death
claimant would encounter little difficulty whenever his suit could
be so framed as to fit the carrier provision.
146 Tex. Gen. Laws 1860, ch. 35, § 1, at 32. In TEx. REv. STAT. 1879, tit. 52, at 419,
the carrier provision and the general death provision appear as separate, connective

subsections.
147 Tex. Gen. Laws 1860, cl. 35, § 2, at 33.
148 See text accompanying notes 37 and 53 supra.
14
0Tex. Gen. Laws 1887, ch. 62, § 1, at 44. Prior to this amendment the Texas
courts consistently denied recovery where gross negligence was not shown. San Antonio
St. Ry. v. Cailloutte, 79 Tex. 341, 15 S.W. 390 (1891); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Brown, 75
Tex. 267, 12 S.W. 1117 (1889); Dallas City R.R. v. Beeman, 74 Tex. 291, 11 S.W. 1102
(1889); Sabine 8- E. Tex. Ry. v. Hanks, 73 Tex. 323, 11 S.W. 377 (1889); Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Hill, 71 Tex. 451, 9 S.W. 351 (1888).
150 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1907, ch. 375, § 1, at 324; Mass. Acts & Resolves 1907, ch.
392, § 1, at 338. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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1. Respondeat Superior Liability
The general death provision of the Texas Model, when considered apart from the remainder of the section, would appear to
offer no difficulty. It was not restricted to deaths occasioned by
willful misconduct, as in Kentucky, 15' nor was the right to recover
limited to deaths caused by acts, as in Rhode Island and North Carolina.152 The Texas Model, however, provided specifically in the
carrier provision for deaths attributable to the misconduct of employees, while no corresponding express provision existed in the
short, general death phrase. 53 This absence of conformity in the
language of the two provisions invited the contention that the death
measure was limited to fatalities occasioned by the defendant's personal misconduct whenever the latter was not a railroad or other
carrier. This argument prevailed in the leading Texas case of
Hendrick v. Walton. 54 In that decision the supreme court conceded
that if the general death provision stood alone, "the maxim that what
one does for another he does himself," would be applicable to a death
r
claim.'55
It concluded, however, that when the legislature made express provision for respondeat superior liability in suits against carriers and omitted any corresponding provision with reference to
other employers it must have intended that a distinction be drawn. 5 6
251See text accompanying note 69 and following note 70 supra.
"12 See text accompanying notes 91 and 94 and following note 99 supra.
158 See text accompanying note 146 supra.
15169 Tex. 192, 6 S.W. 749 (1887).
155
, Id. at 195, 6 S.V. at 750.
158 The same contention was made to the courts in Missouri and New Mexico, but
was rejected. Gray v. McDonald, 104 Mo. 303, 16 S.W. 398 (1891); Hogsett v. Hanna,
41 N.M. 22, 63 P.2d 540 (1936). The rationale used shows the seriousness with which
the matter was regarded.
To escape the contention, both courts felt obliged to characterize their general
death provisions as survival measures. For example, in Gray v. McDonald, supra, the
Missouri court observed: "This section ... does not, as is often supposed, create a new
cause of action; it transmits to the designated persons a cause of action where the
injured person would have had one, had death not ensued. In other words, the cause
of action does not abate by reason of the death of the person injured." 104 Mo. at 311,
16 S.W. at 400. Thus, since the benefits of respondeat superior would have been
available to the deceased, they were available to the representative, who inherited all
his rights. This same rationale was followed by New Mexico in Hogsett v. Hanna,
supra.
But the price of this resolution of the problem was high. Distortion of the general
death provision ensued in both jurisdictions. The Missouri Supreme Court previously
had properly characterized the general death provision as analogous to Lord Campbell's
Act, conferring a new cause of action upon the representative at death. Entwhistle v.
Feighner, 60 Mo. 214, 215 (1875) ("[a claim under the general death provision] , . .is
an action in which plaintiff and defendant only could be parties, for it did not arise
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The court fortified this conclusion by pointing out that in the
original statute of 1860, carriers were liable only for the gross negligence of their employees, and that an application of respondeat
superior under the general death provision would produce the anomalous result of subjecting all employers except carriers to liability
for the ordinary negligence of their workers, thus evidencing a preference of carrier enterprises. 157 This argument, however, is considerably weakened by the fact that the requirement of gross negligence had already been deleted from the carrier provision by the
time of the Hendrick decision. 5 8
There is an impressive line of Texas decisions reaffirming the
position taken in Hendrick v. Walton.159 Corporate liability was
still possible under the general death provision, 1 0 but only when the
conduct of the corporation itself was unlawful or when there was
wrongdoing by a vice-principal in the course of directing the conduct
of the company's business.6 1 Even under these circumstances the
until after the husband's death.'). But as a result of Gray v. McDonald, supra, the
Missouri decisions fell into a state of conflict which ended only in the 1926 decision of
State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S.W. 51 (1926), which affirmed the
wrongful death character of the statute.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, having once adopted the reasoning of Gray v.
McDonald, supra, adhered faithfully thereafter to its commitment to the survival
theory. As late as 1952 it held, in the face of a blistering dissent, that a cause of
action under the general death provision arises at the time of injury, rather than at
the time of death, since the death claim must be regarded as a mere continuation
of the victim's own rights. Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 251 P.2d 274 (1952). It
was not until 1961 that the New Mexico legislature amended the general provision so
as to confirm its character as a wrongful death statute, at least with respect to the
statute of limitations. N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 202, § 1, at 673, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-2
(Supp. 1965).
157 69 Tex. at 196, 6 S.W. at 750.
15s See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
Ig E.g., Hargrave v. Vaughn & Cumming, 82 Tex. 347, 18 S.W. 695 (1891) (druggist not liable for child's death attributed to clerk's negligence in ,selling poison to
parent; suggestion that clerk might be personally liable).
10 Fleming v. Texas Loan Agency, 87 Tex. 238, 27 S.W. 126 (1894).
101Hugo, Schmeltzer & Co. v. Paiz, 104 Tex. 563, 567-68, 141 S.W. 518, 520-21
(1911) (employer liable for death of employee killed as result of negligent directions
given by foreman or supervisor; the court imported the vice-principal doctrine from
cases involving the fellow servant rule).
Cf. Sullivan-Sanford Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 105 Tex. 21, 142 S.W. 1168 (1912),
which illustrates the highly restrictive attitude of the court in such cases. Deceased,
an employee in a sawmill, was directed to do work under the floor of the mill. While
he was so engaged, defendant's foreman ordered another worker to perform a task
at a place in close proximity to the valve of a steam-operated machine. The machinery
was set in motion when the valve was inadvertently pressed by the worker's elbow,
resulting in the death of the deceased beneath the floor. Id. at 24-26, 142 S.W. at
1169-70. The death claim was based upon the negligence of the foreman in ordering
an inexperienced employee to work in the immediate vicinity of the valve without
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Texas court refused the benefits of the general death measure where
the defendant was a municipal corporation, reasoning that a public
entity, unlike a private corporation, did not fall within the coverage
162
of the provision.
2. Resort to the Carrier Provision
The position adopted by Texas in Hendrick v. Walton, which
served to confer virtual immunity against death claims upon all
corporate defendants except carriers, naturally had the effect of
focusing the attention of litigants upon the carrier provision, where
the benefit of respondeat superior remained available. It will be
noted that the language of the carrier provision embraced not only
railroads and steamboats, but also "other vehicle[s] for the conveyance of goods or passengers ... ,"163 The Texas court refused, however, to classify an elevator in a public building as such a "vehicle,"' 164 although both Missouri and Colorado later so held."8, The
Texas result was reached by pointing out that the legislature could
not have contemplated inclusion of elevators within the statute,
since they were not in existence when it was enacted in 1860.160 A
similar determination of legislative intent led to the rejection of a
claim against an express company under the carrier provision for the
death of a person who was shot by its watchman while acting within
the scope of his employment. 1 7
In 1913 the Texas legislature amended the general death provision to impose liability upon all corporations for deaths resulting
from the negligence of their servants, 0 8 thus abrogating the holding
instruction. Id. at 24, 142 S.W. at 1169. Recovery under the general death provision
was denied since the foreman did not instruct the worker to press the valve. Id. at
28-29, 142 S.W. at 1171. Ordering an inexperienced worker to do a job where his
inadvertence would result in injury to others, thought the court, may serve to avoid
the fellow servant rule, but it would not meet the strictures of the language of the
general death act. See id. at 29-30, 142 S.W. at 1172.
202 Elliott v. City of Brownwood, 106 Tex. 292, 166 S.W. 1129 (1914). Similarly, it
was held that a receiver of a railway was not a "proprietor" within the meaning of
the carrier provision. Turner v. Cross & Eddy, 83 Tex. 218, 18 S.W. 578 (1892).
Thereafter receivers were brought within the purview of the statute by amendment.
Tex. Gen. Laws 1892, 1st Sess., ch. 7, §1, at 5.
110See text accompanying note 146 supra.
20 Farmers' & Mechanics' Natl Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 328-29, 137 S.W. 1120,
1125 (1911).
"I0Davis v. Colorado Say. Bank, 78 Colo. 509, 242 Pac. 985 (1926); Williams v.
Short, 219 Mo. App. 99, 268 S.W. 706 (1925).
100 Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 328-29, 137 S.W.
1120, 1125 (1911).
20 Lipscomb v. Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry., 95 Tex. 5, 64 S.W. 923 (1901).
21 Tex. Gen. Laws 1913, ch. 143, at 288.
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in Hendrick v. Walton. In Hamilton v. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex.
Ry., 169 however, this amendment was held invalid because of defects
in its title. Finally, in 1921, the Texas statute was completely overhauled by the legislature, 170 and respondeat superior liability was
imposed on all defendants.
3. Other Carrier Provision Problems
Lipscomb v. Houston e Tex. Cent. Ry.' 71 held that a railroad
employer was liable when its watchman, acting within the scope of
his employment, shot and killed the decedent. It is not clear, however, that the Texas court would correspondingly extend the protection of the carrier provision to similar risks not readily and immediately associated with transportation activities. In Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. v. Freeman,172 for example, recovery was denied where
the railroad's surgeon carelessly detained a patient, who then communicated small pox to the decedent.
For many years confusion persisted in Texas on whether the
provision for death liability directed to the proprietors of any railroad, steamboat "or other vehicle for the conveyance of goods or
passengers"' 173 was restricted to common carriers, or extended to those
transporting their own goods in commerce. Although the issue was
not brought sharply into focus in the earlier decisions, their general
tenor clearly suggests that only those who offered their transportation
services to the public at large were includedY7
In several later
cases, however, liability under the above provision was imposed
upon the operators of railroads used solely in connection with lumbering and other industrial activities conducted by their owners.'7 5
In 1926 the issue was finally put to rest in favor of the broader
coverage by Hamilton v. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. 170 The court
held that the carrier provision embraced a death resulting from
110115 Tex. 455, 283 S.W. 475 (1926).
170

Tex. Gen. Laws 1921, ch. 109, at 212, TEx. REv. Civ.

STAT. ANN.

art. 4671 (1952).

95 Tex. 5, 64 S.W. 923 (1901).
172 97 Tex. 394, 79 S.W. 9 (1904).
178 See text accompanying note 146 supra.
17
. See cases collected and discussed in Hamilton v. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry., 115
Tex. 455, 466-68, 283 S.V. 475, 478-49 (1926).
175 Sullivan-Sanford Lumber Co. v. Watson, 106 Tex. 4, 155 S.W. 179 (1913) (private railroad owned by lumber company); Cunningham v. Neal, 101 Tex. 338, 107 S.W.
539 (1908) (private railroad owned by sugar and paper mill); cI. Farmers' & Mechanics'
Nat'1 Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 328, 137 S.W. 1120, 1124-25 (1911) (dictum that
statute might cover private property).
170 115 Tex. 455, 283 S.W. 475 (1926).
171
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the negligent operation of a truck belonging to a petroleum company
which was being used at the time for the transportation of its own
products. 7 7 There was no indication, however, that a private motor
vehicle used for non-business purposes would be similarly covered.
4. General Revision
In 1921, the Texas legislature completely revised the death
statute. 7 The language of the present statute, which is patterned
basically on the model of Lord Campbell's Act, serves as a reminder
of the complex and unrealistic state of the law that preceded its
enactment. The legislature, in an earnest effort to avoid for the
future all the complexities that had formerly beset the death law of
Texas, undertook to spell out each earlier deficiency and to obviate
it specifically. Although the resulting statute, which is presently in
force, is a cumbersome and repetitious measure, there can remain
little doubt as to the comprehensive scope of its coverage.
F. Arizona
Fortunately, the Arizona version of the Texas Model was of short
life. It was repealed fourteen years after its enactment in 1887, and
a measure similar to Lord Campbell's Act substituted for it.Y19 The
earlier statute was in effect long enough, however, to afford the
Arizona Supreme Court an opportunity to follow the Texas decision
in Hendrick v. Walton, thus denying to plaintiffs the benefit of
respondeat superior in all Arizona death claims against defendants
who did not qualify under the carrier provision. 8 0
G. The Dakotas
The final variation of a dual coverage statute was enacted for
the Dakota Territory in 1874.181 The first section of this measure,
authorizing a recovery where death was caused by the negligence of
railroads or their employees, was a survival statute which empowered
the personal representative to recover damages "in the same manner
that the [deceased] person might have done for any injury where
177Id. at 468-69, 283 S.W. at 479.
178 Tex. Gen. Laws 1921, ch. 109, at 212, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (1952).
179ARiZ. REV. STAT. 1901, §§ 2764-66.
210Don Yan v. Ah You, 4 Ariz. 109, 77 Pac. 618 (1893).
181 DAEOTA TERR. LAWS 1874, ch. 54, at 217 (1875). Almost identical provisions
appear in 1 DAKOTA TERR. REV. CODES ANN. 1883, §§ 676-77.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1965: 673

ensue."'182

death did not
Recovery under this provision was denied
where the death was instantaneous.183 The second section of the
Dakota death statute was comprehensive in coverage and extended
to deaths caused by the negligence of all persons and corporations,
and included servants. 184 The right of recovery was vested in the
85
widow, heir, or personal representative.1
This latter section as originally enacted in 1874 authorized the
recovery of "punitive damages for the loss or destruction of the life
aforesaid."'' 88 Thirteen years later, however, the term "punitive"
was stricken from the statute. 8 7 Thereafter, the general death provision was regarded by the courts as analogous to Lord Campbell's
Act, under which damages were assessed in terms of the losses
suffered by the beneficiaries. 8 8
The Dakota courts applied the general death measure to deaths
caused by railroad operations, 8 9 with the result that where the
defendant was a railroad, both the wrongful death remedy and a
suit under the survivorship theory of the first section were available.
Against other defendants, however, the claimant was restricted to
damages caused by the death, and there could be no recovery of
182 "If the life of any person, not in the employment of a railroad corporation, shall
be lost, in this territory, by the reason of the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor or proprietors of any railroad, or by the unfitness or negligence or carelessness
of their employes or agents, the personal representatives of the person whose life is

so lost, may institute suit and recover damages in the same manner that the person
might have done for any injury where death did not ensue." 1 DAKOTA Tamm. REv.
CODES
8 ANN. 1883, § 676. (Emphasis added.)
'1
Belding v. Black Hills & Ft. P.R.R., 3 S.D. 369, 53 N.W. 750 (1892).
'18,,If the life of any person or persons is lost or destroyed by the neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness of another person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporation [sic], their or his agents, or servants or employes, then the
widow, heir, or personal representatives of the deceased shall have the right to sue
such person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, and recover punitive damages for the loss or destruction of the life aforesaid." 1 DAKOTA
TERR.
185 REV. CoDEs ANN.

1883, § 677.

See note 184 supra.
DAKOTA TERR. LAws 1874, ch. 54, § 2, at 217 (1875).
287 DAKOTA TaRR. LAws 1887, ch. 27, § 1, at 69.
188Haug v. Great No. Ry., 8 N.D. 23, 77 N.W. 97 (1898) (pecuniary loss presumed
where claimant was wife or minor child of deceased); Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 6 S.D. 583, 62 N.W. 967 (1895) (damages restricted to pecuniary loss; nondependent parent of adult child denied recovery); Belding v. Black Hills & Ft. P.R.R.,
3 S.D. 369, 53 N.W. 750 (1892) (widow treated as having preferred rights to recover
under
general death section).
88
2 The possibility that the survival provision might be the exclusive remedy in
suits against railroads appears never to have been considered by the courts. Note
that all the cases under present discussion involved claims against railroads.
188
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damages that accrued prior thereto.91 0 The Dakota dual coverage
provision remained in effect in North Dakota until 1895, when it
was superseded by a single provision for wrongful death that tracked
the language of Lord Campbell's Act. 191 In South Dakota the
original measure was not abandoned in favor of a wrongful death
statute until 1909.192
IV
RAILROAD DEATH ACTS ENACTED AFTER GENERAL DEATH ACTS

We have seen that many of the special provisions for death inflicted by railroads were regarded as independent measures that
coexisted side by side with general death provisions and were in
frequent conflict with the latter. This, however, was not to be true
of two states, Michigan and Connecticut, which had death provisions
of general application already in effect when the legislatures undertook to enact special statutes with reference to railroad deaths.
A. Michigan
As early as 1838 the Michigan legislature had provided for the
survival of claims for assault, battery, and imprisonment. 93 Ten
years later it adopted a death statute phrased in language almost
identical to that of Lord Campbell's Act. 194 With these two mea100 Provision was ultimately made for the survival of all personal injury claims in
North Dakota in 1949, N.D. Laws 1949, ch. 213, § 1, at 277, N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-26.1
(1960), and in South Dakota in 1951, S.D. Laws 1951, ch. 186, §§ 1-2, at 196, S.D.
CODE § 33.0414-1 (Supp. 1960). Cf. Ulvig v. McKennan Hosp., 56 S.D. 509, 229 N.W. 383
(1930) (no recovery for pain and suffering of child burned to death through negligence of hospital).
101 N.D. REv. CODEs 1895, §§ 5974-77, as amended, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (1960).
102S.D. Laws 1909, ch. 301, at 497, as amended, S.D. CODE §§ 37.2201-.2203 (Supp.

1960), Rowe v. Richards, 32 S.D. 66, 142 N.W. 664 (1913) (dual coverage statute repealed by implication with enactment of general death statutes).
103 MicH. Rav. STAT. pt. 3, tit. 2, ch. 3, § 7 (1838); see text accompanying note 9
supra.
104 "Section 1. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, (if death had not
ensued,) have entitled the party injured to main an action, and recover damages,
in respect thereof, then and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation
which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death
shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
"Section 2. Every such action shall be brought by, and in the names of the
personal representatives of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in every
such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such
deceased person, and shall be distributed to such widow and next of kin in the
proportions provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal property, left
by persons dying intestate; and in every such action, the jury may give such damages
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sures already in force the legislature nevertheless undertook in 1855
to make special provision for railroad deaths in Michigan's first general railroad incorporation statute. 195 This death measure duplicated the earlier death statute in every respect, except that "railroad
company or its agents" was used to designate the party whose act,
neglect or default would give rise to the death action, and damages
recoverable were limited to 5,000 dollars.
In 1873 the railroad provision was amended by striking out the
limitation on the amount recoverable and by omitting the limitation
to "pecuniary injuries" which had appeared in the original railroad
measure, and which continued to appear in the general death
statute.01 This single resulting inconsistency between the two acts
inevitably resulted in litigation. In Van Brunt v. Cincinnati,J. &.
M.R.R., 197 suit was brought by a non-dependent father for the death
of an adult son killed by the defendant railroad. The claimant contended that the legislature of 1872, in removing the 5,000 dollar
limitation and omitting the former express restriction to pecuniary
damages, intended that damages assessed against railroads should be
whatever the jury might deem "fair and just."'' 8 The court rejected
this contention, stating that an assessment of damages against railroads on a basis different from that which would prevail in death
suits against other defendants would be class legislation, which the
court did not believe the legislature had intended.0 0
The Van Brunt decision resulted in a requirement of demonstrable pecuniary loss under both the railroad statute and the general death act, thus robbing the former measure of any apparent
justification. Nevertheless, the railroad death act remained in effect.
Finally, in 1951, the court held that the measure had been repealed
by implication when both the general death act and the Michigan
survival statute were substantially amended and consolidated in
1939.200
as they shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from
such death, to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person." Mich. Laws 1848,
No. 38, §§ 1-2, at 31.
'Or Mich. Laws 1855, No. 82, §§ 54-55, at 176.
216 1 Mich. Laws 1873, No. 198, art. 5, §§ 7-8, at 496.
297 78 Mich. 530, 44 N.W. 321 (1889).
198
Id. at 535, 44 N.V. at 322.
31, Id. at 537-38, 44 N.W. at 323.
200 Mich. Pub. & Local Acts 1939, No. 297, at 687, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.711-.713
(1962), Southward v. Wabash R.R., 331 Mich. 138, 49 N.W.2d 109 (1951).
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B. Connecticut
It will be recalled that the legislature in Connecticut in 1848
provided for the survival of all personal injury claims without qualication.20 1 This measure had been successfully employed as a remedy
in fatal railroad accidents.2 0 2 In Murphy v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R.20 3 the Connecticut court extended the statute to cover even
instantaneous deaths. In so doing the court treated the death itself as
an injury to the deceased that deprived him of all prospective earnings. It thus prepared the way for use of the survival statute as the
exclusive vehicle for recovery in fatal accident cases in Connecticut.
Nevertheless, in 1853 Connecticut enacted a railroad death
statute. 20 4 This measure was limited to claims on behalf of deceased passengers and persons killed at highway crossings. It authorized an award of 1,000 to 5,000 dollars, to be recovered by the administrator. The measure included a provision for the distribution
of the proceeds of the judgment. Shortly after the enactment of this
statute, the Connecticut court was faced with a situation in which
the sole beneficiary died soon after the decease of the railroad
victim; 20 5 hence the pain and suffering of the deceased between the
time of accident and death constituted the chief item of damages that
could be recovered. It was argued that there could be no award for
these damages under the special railroad provision.2 0 6 The court,
however, held that damages for pain and suffering were justifiable
under the survival statute even though the claimant had placed no
reliance on this measure.20 7 In so deciding the court declined to hold
either that the special statute and the survival measure afforded
separate cumulative remedies, or that the defendant should elect
which he would pursue, or that the railroad death act was the ex201 Conn. Acts 1848, ch. 5, § 2. at 7, also cited in CONN. REV. STAT. 1849, ch. 6, § 82,
at 72.
202 Soule v. New York & N.H.R.R., 24 Conn. 575 (1856).
20830 Conn. 184 (1861).
204 Conn. Pub. Acts 1853, ch. 74, § 8, at 135. In 1869 this act was supplemented by
a statute requiring the construction and maintenance of fences along railroad rights
of way, with similar remedial provisions. Conn. Pub. Acts 1869, ch. 48, §§ 1-2, at 235.
An earlier statute, directing the sounding of the highway crossing signal by railroads, imposed an arbitrary penalty of $1000 for death of any person killed through a
violation. The penalty was payable to the widow and children of the victim, or, in
their default, to the nearest relative of the deceased. Conn. Pub. Acts 1851, ch. 43,
§ 2, at 43. This statute was repealed in 1877. Conn. Pub. Acts 1877, ch. 78, §2, at
192.
200 Goodsell v. Hartford & N.H.R.R., 33 Conn. 51 (1865).
200
Id. at 52.
20
7Id. at 55.
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clusive remedy with reference to deaths falling within the scope of
its coverage. Instead, the court regarded the special statute as a
mere specification of the survival measure. 208

As such, this special

provision therefore merely provided a limitation on the amount to
be recovered under the survival act against railroad defendants,
coupled with an arbitrary provision for the distribution of the
proceeds of recovery in suits against this one class of defendants. 20
Thus the railroad statute became amalgamated into the survival
measure.

210

Despite this situation, the Connecticut legislature continued to
tolerate the coexistence of the two acts. In 1872 the provision for
the distribution of proceeds, which formerly appeared only in the
211
railroad act, was incorporated verbatim into the survival statute.
The limitation on the amount recoverable, however, remained a
feature of the railroad statute alone. This last inconsistency between
the two measures could have been removed either by expunging
the limitation on damages from the special act or by imposing a
similar limitation with respect to the survival measure. Neither
alternative, however, was adopted by the Connecticut lawmakers.
Instead, the legislature in 1877 enacted in place of the former railroad statute a new death section of general application, which provided that "in all actions by an executor or administrator for
damages resulting in death from negligence" the executor or administrator might recover "just damages not exceeding five thousand
dollars." 2 12 The measure further provided that these damages should
be distributed as provided in the amended survival statute. This
method of distribution, as we have seen, had been taken over into
the survival measure from the original railroad statute. Thus, both
features which had distinguished the old railroad act became incorporated in what appeared on the surface to be a new, independent
death statute of general application, and which, arguably, was now a
potential competitor with the established survival statute.
We have seen, however, that from the very beginning the Connecticut courts had taken a broad view of the protection afforded by
the survival statute of 1848. In making this measure available in
8

'0 Id. at 56.

o Ibid.
10

34 Conn. 57 (1867) (under railway act
of 1853 cause of action did not arise until death of victim).
211 Conn. Pub. Acts 1872, ch. 69, at 40.
212 Conn. Pub. Acts 1877, ch. 78, § 1, at 191.
9 But cf. Andrews v. Hartford & N.H.R.R.,
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cases of instantaneous death, it had committed itself to the theory
that the death was a wrong to the victim himself and that the
damages to be recovered should be measured in terms of the loss
of the victim's earnings from the time of accident until the expiration of his normal life expectancy. 213 Even the estimated living
expenses of the deceased during this period were not to be deducted
in arriving at the amount of the award to his administrator.2 14 When
this state of the Connecticut case law on survivorship is borne in
mind, it becomes obvious that no second and cumulative remedy for
death could be tolerated without facing the prospect of substantial
double recovery. To escape this dilemma, the courts interpreted the
1877 amendment just as the original railroad death statute had been
interpreted-as a mere specification of the survival measure, imposing a limitation on the amount recoverable and designating the
beneficiaries to whom the proceeds of the judgment under the
survival statute should be distributed.215 This attack upon the
problem has persisted, and although the statutes have been altered
in several respects, 21 6 the survival theory of recovery for wrongful
death prevails even today in Connecticut.
V
OTHER SPECIAL DEATH ACTS

Although Michigan and Connecticut represent the only significant instances in which the legislatures undertook to introduce
special railroad death provisions into comprehensive schemes which
were already in operation,217 there were a few legislative efforts to
21a Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 At. 987 (1913).
114See Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946) (full review of authorities; court repudiates statement in earlier Connecticut decisions suggesting that lost
accumulations to estate furnish proper measure of damages).
21 See Porpora v. City of New Haven, 122 Conn. 80, 86-93, 187 At. 668, 671-73
(1936), which reviews the complicated shifting of provisions between the survival
statute and the "death act" of 1877. According to the opinion there was a short
period of one year, following the revision of 1902, CONN. REv. STAT. 1902, §§ 399,
1094, when the survival measure was eliminated by absorption into the "death act."
Survival was restored in 1903, Conn. Pub. Acts 1903, ch. 149, at 114. See also Comment, 22 CONN. B.J. 404, 407 n.15 (1948). The limitation on the overall amount
recoverable was increased to $20,000 by the legislature in three successive stages
and finally eliminated entirely in 1951. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 1392b (Supp. 1951).
Despite the survival character of the Connecticut statute, the proceeds are not subject to the claims of general creditors. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 1305e (Supp.
1939).
216 The present provisions of the Connecticut wrongful death statutes are CONN.
GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 52-555, 52-599, 45-280 (1958).
217 Brief reference should be made to the earliest Georgia effort at death legisla-
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single out other special situations for distinct treatment in the face
of preexisting statutes of general application. In 1895, thirty-six
years after the adoption of a general death statute, 218 the constitution of South Carolina was amended to include a penal provision
authorizing an award of not less than 2,000 dollars against any county
in which a lynching took place, "without regard to the conduct
of the officers," in favor of the legal representative of any person
killed by such mob action. 219 Provision was made for recovery over
by the county against the actual participants. 220 This was followed
the next year by similar action in Ohio, 221 where a general death
provision had been on the statute books for forty-five years.2 22 Both
223
special statutes remain in effect today.
VI
THE EMPLOYERS'

LIABILITY MOVEMENT:

FURTHER CONFUSION

IN DEATH STATUTES

The last two decades of the nineteenth century ushered in a wave
of legislative reform affecting the rights of employees to recover for
injuries resulting from negligence of employers or of fellow employees. Most of the earlier measures of this kind did little more
than afford a legislative recognition of the vice-principal or superiortion. In 1850 the legislature enacted a death act with general coverage, Ga. Stat.
1850, No. 83, at 476 (Cobb 1851). This measure merely authorized suit by the
administrator whenever the deceased could have maintained an action, and it directed that half of the proceeds be paid to the wife and children in the event of the
estate's being insolvent. It is difficult to determine whether the measure should be
regarded as a death statute or as a provision for survival, and no occasion arose for
a clarification by the courts during the brief period of its existence. Cf. SouthWestern R.R. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356 (1858). Six years thereafter the legislature passed
an equally cryptic statute directed exclusively toward deaths occasioned by the negligence of railroad companies or their employees. Ga. Laws 1855-56, No. 106, §4,
at 155 (1856). No suit was ever instituted pursuant to this measure. In 1863 both
statutes were superseded by a single measure of general coverage known as the
Homicide Act, which served as the nucleus for the present Georgia death statute.
GA. CODE 1863, § 2913 (1933), as amended, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-1301 to -1310, as
amended, GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1306 (Supp. 1963). See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Cassin, 111 Ga. 575, 600-11, 36 S.E. 881, 891-95 (1900) (dissenting opinion).
218 S.C. Acts 1857-59, No. 4480, at 825 (1859).
219 S.C. CONsT. art. VI, § 6.
This constitutional provision was implemented by S.C.
220 S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
kcts 1896, No. 94, at 213.
221 92 Ohio Laws §§ 5-12, at 137 (1896).
222 49 Ohio Laws 117 (1851).
228 OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3761.04-3761.10 (Page 1954); S.C. CoNs-r. art. VI, § 6;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1961 (1962).
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servant doctrine and, in some instances, of the separate-departmentof-work rule. Furthermore, the benefits of the first American
statutes of this sort were generally confined to employees of railroads,
22 4
and occasionally mines.
Since the only purpose of such legislation was to abolish or
modify certain employer defenses that had existed at common law,
there was no sound reason why these measures should disturb the
existing pattern of general death legislation, which merely conferred
a right to recover in case of death whenever the deceased could have
recovered if the injury had not been fatal. 225 The majority of the
early employers' liability statutes proceeded on this premise. Some
of the measures mentioned only employee injuries,226 others referred
to both injuries and death,227 while still others contained express
language indicating that if the employee were killed, recovery should
be secured through resort to the established death statutes. 228 Usually
221See generally DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 11-16 (1936).
The statutes prior to 1913 are listed and analyzed in 5 LAATr, MASTER AND SERVANT
(2d ed. 1913).
22u Philo v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 33 Iowa 47 (1871); Ean v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
95 Wis. 69, 69 N.W. 997 (1897); Gumz v. Chicago, St. P. & M. Ry., 52 Wis. 672, 10
N.W. 11 (1881) (by implication); see Vickers v. Board of County Comm'rs, 59 Kan. 86,
52 Pac. 73 (1898); Racho v. City of Detroit, 90 Mich. 92, 51 N.W. 360 (1892); Merkle
v. Township of Bennington, 58 Mich. 156, 24 N.W. 776 (1885); Eames v. Town of.
Brattleboro, 54 Vt. 471 (1882).
-22
Fla. Laws 1891, ch. 4071, § 3, at 114 (repealing Fla. Laws 1887, ch. 3744, § 2, at
117); Ga. Laws 1856, No. 103, § 3, at 155; GA. CODE 1873, § 3036; Iowa Laws 1862, ch.
169, § 7, at 198; Iowa Laws 1872, ch. 65, at 70; Kan. Laws 1874, ch. 93, at 143; Minn.
Laws 1887, ch. 13, at 69; MINN. REV. LAWs 1905, § 2042; Mont. Terr. Laws 1873, § 20,
at 104; N.D. Laws 1903, ch. 131, at 178; Ohio Laws 1890, § 2, at 149; Okla. Laws 1907,
ch. 53, § 5, at 520; Pa. Laws 1907, No. 329, at 523; Utah Laws 1896, ch. 24, at 99; Wis.
Laws 1880, ch. 232, at 270 (repealing Wis. REv. STAT. 1878, § 1816, which had reworded
Wis. Laws 1875, ch. 173, § 1, at 293); Wis. Laws 1889, ch. 438, at 613; Wis. Laws 1903,
ch. 448, at 741 (rewording Wis. Laws 1893, ch. 220, § I, at 268).
227 Ark. Acts 1893, ch. 46, at 68; Ark. Acts 1907, No. 69, at 162; Ind. Acts 1907, ch.
118, § 14, at 190; Kan. Laws 1907, ch. 281, § 1, at 454; N.C. Priv. Laws 1897, ch. 56,
§ 1, at 83; Ohio Laws 1890, § 3, at 149; OHIO GEN. CODE 1910, § 6242; Tex. Gen. Laws
1891, ch. 24, at 25.
228 Colo. Laws 1893, ch. 77, § 1 (3), at 129 (employee has same rights as if he were
not an employee), Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Mitchell, 26 Colo. 284, 58 Pac.
28 (1899); Ind. Laws 1893, ch. 130, § 3, at 295 (express reference to "the law now in
force'); N.J. Laws 1909, ch. 83, § 1 (3), at 114 (employee has same rights as if he were
not an employee); 2 N.Y. Laws 1902, ch. 600, § 1 (2), at 1749 (express reference); S.C.
CONsT. art. 9, § 15 (1895) (employee has same rights as if he were not an employee;
limited to railroad employees); Vt. Laws 1910, No. 97, § 1, at 101 (employee has same
rights as if he were not an employee; limited to railroad employees); VA. CONsr. § 162
(1902), Va. Laws 1901-02, ch. 322, at 335 (1902) (separate :right of action given to
railroad employees is not to interfere with other rights); Wyo. Terr. Laws 1869, ch.
65, at 433 (employee has same rights as if he were not an employee; limited to railroad
employees).
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no difficulty was encountered by the courts when the statutes were of
the types indicated above. 229 However, the supreme court of at least
one jurisdiction, Missouri, adopted the position that the employers'
liability act of that state23 0 conferred only a personal right upon the
employee which would not be embraced under the earlier death
statutes of the state if he were killed.3 1 Thereafter the Missouri
legislature was obliged to amend the death statute so as to include
specifically "an employe . . . whose death is caused by the negligence of a co-employe ....232
The legislatures in a large group of states (Alabama, Illinois,
Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon and Vermont),
possibly in anticipation of a holding such as that of the Missouri
court, made special, and sometimes elaborate, provision for death
suits in their respective employers' liability statutes. In nearly every
instance these measures differed in one respect or another from the
then prevailing general death statute; and whenever the deceased
employee's own cause of action would depend upon an employers'
liability statute, his surviving family or administrator was forced
to ignore the general death measure and accept the procedures and
benefits provided by the special act.233
220See note 225 supra.

220 Mo. Laws 1897, §§ 1-4, at 96.
2
31 Strottman v. St. Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 211 Mo. 227, 252-258, 109 S.W. 769, 775-777
(1908). Four years later the Missouri court in a carefully considered opinion repudiated this decision. Hawkins v. Smith, 242 Mo. 688, 147 S.W. 1042 (1912).
282Mo. Laws 1905, § 1, at 136.
nssIn the following paragraphs the situation is described at the time of the enactment of the special act. In many instances subsequent modifications of the death
statutes or the special acts have obviated or modified the discrepancies.
Alabama: The first Alabama provision establishing the vice-principal rule, Ala.
Acts 1884-85, No. 51, at 115 (1885), was so drawn as to present no conflict with the
general death statute of the state, Ala. Acts 1871-72, No. 62, at 83 (1872). The Alabama
Supreme Court so held in Stewart v. Louisville & N.R.R., 83 Ala. 493, 4 So. 373 (1888).
A second general Alabama death statute, Ala. Acts 1884-85, No. 36, at 99 (1885),
authorized a parent to sue for the death of a child. Where the child was an employee with the consent of the father, however, the court held that suit could be
maintained only by the representative under the employers' liability act. Williams
v. South & No. Ala. R.R., 91 Ala. 635, 9 So. 77 (1891); Lovell v. DeBardelaben Coal
& Iron Co., 90 Ala. 13, 7 So. 756 (1890).
Idaho: In 1909 the Idaho legislature adopted a measure modifying the fellowservant rule and abrogating the assumption-of-risk doctrine for specific employments
under limited circumstances. Idaho Laws 1909, at 34. This statute required in § 5
that notice be given the employer within 150 days following the death, and § 4 limited
damages to $5,000. These provisions did not appear in the general death act, IDAHO
REv. CoDEs 1908, § 4100.
The Idaho courts have had little occasion to refer to the employers' liability
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statute. Where, for example, suit was brought under the general death act, the
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the employer's argument that the notice provision of
the employers' liability act had not been met, stating that the latter act "did not
repeal or abrogate any existing law with reference to the right of recovery by the
heirs or legal representatives of a deceased person for an injury causing the death
of such person." Chiara v. Stewart Mining Co., 24 Idaho 473, 479, 135 Pac. 245, 246
(1913).
Illinois 6.Indiana: The Illinois statute regulating the operation of mines created
a cause of action for employee injuries or deaths occasioned by a willful violation of

its provisions. Ill. Pub. Laws 1871, § 14, at 574, also cited in ILL. REv. STAT. 1874, ch.
93, § 14, at 708. Suit was to be instituted by the widow or other designated beneficiaries in their individual capacities, while the prevailing Illinois death statute of the
same period authorized suit only by the administrator. Ill. Gen. Laws 1853, § 2, at
97, also cited in ILL. RaV. STAT. 1874, ch. 70, § 2, at 582. In Litchfield Coal Co. v.
Taylor, 81 111. 590, 592 (1876), a suit brought by the administrator under the mining
statute was dismissed. In Bradley v. Chicago-Virden Coal Co., 231 Ill. 622, 83 N.E.
424 (1908), the designated claimant was shifted three times during the litigation in
order to include or exclude the claim from the mining law, until finally all rights
were barred by the statute of limitations.
The same conflicts existed between the Indiana mining act, Ind. Laws 1891, ch. 49,
at 57, and the Indiana death act, Ind. Laws 1881, ch. 38, § 8, at 241, also cited in IND.
STAT. ANN. § 285 (Bums 1894). The administrator could not sue under the mining act.
Maule Coal Co. v. Parthenheimer, 155 Ind. 100, 55 N.E. 751 (1900); Collins Coal Co.

v. Hadley, 58 Ind. App. 637, 645, 75 N.E. 832, 833 (1906). Cf. Couchman v. Prather,
162 Ind. 250, 70 N.E. 240 (1904), where suit by the administrator under the death act
was dismissed because a special statute covering damages from the illegal sale of
intoxicants, 3 IND. STAT. ANN. § 7288 (Bums 1901), provided for suit by "any person
who shall sustain any injury or damage to his . . . means of support."

Maine &' Vermont: Compare the Maine employers' liability act, Me. Laws 1909,
ch. 258, at 356, modeled after the English statute of 1880, to § 9 and § 10 of the prevailing Maine general death statute of the same period, ME. REv. STAT. 1903, ch. 89,
at 784. The Maine death statute had been interpreted to apply only in cases of instantaneous death. Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. 42, 3 Ad. 660 (1895). In the employers'
liability act, express provision was made for both instantaneous and noninstantaneous
death, Me. Laws 1909, ch. 258, §§ 2-5, at 356.
Both the Vermont employers' liability statute, Vt. Laws 1910, No. 97, at 101, and
the Vermont death statute, VT. PuB. STAT. 1906, §§ 2859-40, were similar to the corresponding Maine provisions. The general death acts of both states were almost verbatim copies of Lord Campbell's Act, and provided that damages should be assessed
in terms of the losses suffered by the beneficiaries. The employers' liability statutes
in both states, however, directed that damages for death be assessed "with reference
to the degree of culpability of the employer or of the person for whose negligence
the employer is liable." Me. Laws 1909, ch. 258, § 4, at 37; Vt. Laws 1910, No. 97,
§ 5, at 102. The two statutes in each state also differed with respect to the beneficiaries,
the persons entitled to institute the suit, and the distribution of the proceeds.
Mississippi: The first statute of this state establishing the vice-principal doctrine
and the separate-department-of-work rule, Miss. Laws 1896, ch. 87, at 97, set up a
complete scheme for the maintenance of suits for employee deaths. This statute
differed from the general death statute passed during the same session, Miss. Laws
1896, ch. 86, at 96, with respect to beneficiaries, the method of assessing damages,
and the distribution of the judgment proceeds. See Bussey v. Gulf & S.I.R.R., 79 Miss.
597, 31 So. 212 (1902) (despite differences between statutes, employers' statute did not
pre-empt general death statute as to employees).
Montana: Montana statutes in 1905 abrogated the fellow-servant rule for railroad
employees, Mont. Laws 1905, ch. 1, § 1, at 1, and for mine employees, Mont. Laws
1905, ch. 23, § 1, at 51. The railroad provision in § 2 and the mine provision in § 3
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Shortly after 1908 a new wave of state legislation for the protection of railroad workers emerged as a result of the enactment of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 234 The aim of Congress in
this latter measure was to abolish the fellow-servant rule, to substitute comparative negligence for contributory negligence, and to
soften the rigors of the assumed-risk doctrine. 235 To effectuate these
policies, Congress realized it had to face the death problem in a
federal context. Federal common law denied any cause of action
stated that the employee's cause of action should survive to the personal representative
or heirs. At this time Montana's general death statute was similar to Lord Campbell's
Act. See II MONT. RFv. CODES 1907, § 6486. Thus if death were instantaneous, the
general death statute would provide a remedy, but the railroad and mine statutes
would not. Therefore if recovery depended upon the measure abolishing the
fellows-servant rule and death was instantaneous, no recovery was possible. Dillon v.
Great No. R.R., 38 Mont. 485, 492-93, 100 Pac. 960, 962 (1909).
An interesting and complicated variation of the Montana picture was presented
to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. Prior to the enactment
of the 1905 Montana railroad statute, which completely abolished the fellow-servant
rule, there was in effect a 1903 statute which modified the fellow-servant rule by designating certain railroad employees who were not to be regarded as fellow-servants,
Mont. Laws 1903, ch. 83, § I, at 156. This latter statute contained no death provision, thereby bringing the general death statute of Montana into operation. In
Storrs v. Northern Pac. Ry., 148 App. Div. 403, 132 N.Y. Supp. 954 (1911), a worker
was killed after the effective date of the 1905 statute, but his death resulted from
the negligence of one of the superior servants included within the coverage of the
1903 measure. Id. at 409, 132 N.Y. Supp. at 958-59. The New York court, applying
Montana law, held that the general death statute was applicable, although if the
negligent co-worker had been one other than a superior servant, the only remedy
would have been survivorship under the 1905 act. Ibid.
Oregon: In 1910 the people of Oregon by initiative enacted a measure imposing
:ery exacting duties on contractors for the benefit of their workers. See Ore. Gen.
Laws 1911, ch. 3, at 16. The death provision of this measure, § 4, provided expressly
that damages for death should be without limitation, while the general death provision then in force, Ore. Gen. Laws 1907, ch. 72, at 128, also cited in I ORE. LAWs
§ 380 (Lord 1910), provided for a maximum limit of $7,500. The Oregon Supreme
Court held in Cameron v. Pacific Lime & Gypsum Co., 73 Ore. 510, 144 Pac. 446
(1914), that the $7,500 limit was therefore not applicable in a case brought under
the special statute.
Recovery under the special statute was to be sought directly by the designated
beneficiaries, while the general death statute authorized a proceeding by the personal
representative only. If none of the designated beneficiaries existed, the personal representative could still sue under the general death statute, but subject to the $7,500
limit. Niemi v. Stanley Smith Lumber Co., 77 Ore. 221, 147 Pac. 532, affirmance rev'd
on rehearing, 77 Ore. 221, 149 Pac. 1033 (1915). Damages for death under the general statute were measured during this period in terms of loss of accumulations to
the estate. See Hansen v. Hayes, 175 Ore. 358, 379, 154 P.2d 202, 210 (1944).
The Oregon legislature in 1903 adopted a measure establishing the superiorservant rule for railroad employees. Ore. Laws 1903, §§ 1-2, at 20. In contrast to
the special contractors' liability statute, the short provision in this measure for
employee deaths was consistent with the general death act.
2'35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
2'See
DOHERTY, LIABILITY OF RAILROADS TO INTERsTATE EMPLoyErs 39-44 (1911).
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death, 236

and hence a specific death provision was
for wrongful
necessary to protect the families of deceased workers. Consequently,
the Federal Employers' Liability Act was equipped with a death
provision 237 similar to Lord Campbell's Act. The personal representative was authorized to sue for the death on behalf of designated beneficiaries, who were established in preferred and deferred
categories. The suit was "for the benefit of the surviving widow
or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of
such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee ....,"238 There was no express provision for the distribution of the proceeds of judgment; neither was
there any limitation upon the amount to be recovered. The statute
did require, however, that the suit be commenced within two years
from the date the cause of action accrued.2 39 Two years later, in
1910, a survival provision was added, which permitted the inclusion
of damages for the pain and suffering of the deceased and for his
pecuniary losses up until the time of death.2 0
The federal statute by its terms applied only to railroad employees who were injured or killed while they were actively engaged
in interstate commerce, 241 thus leaving a large segment of railroad
employee accidents untouched. In view of this limited reach of
federal coverage, the state legislatures were urged to enact similar
statutes to protect railroad workers against accidents that fell outside
the ambit of the federal measure. In so doing, the state legislatures
were free to provide for death in such manner as they saw fit. Since
in every instance there were existing state death statutes available,
the lawmakers might easily have either omitted all references to
death or omitted entirely that portion of the federal act providing
a death remedy, thus referring the procedure to the appropriate
10 The United States Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754
(1877), committed itself to the doctrine of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
237 35 Stat. 65, § 1 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
23135 Stat. 65, § 1 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
211Section 6, 35 Stat. 66 (1908). This was changed to 3 years by Act of Aug. 11,
1939, § 2, 53 Stat. 1404, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1964).
240Act of April 5, 1910, § 2, 36 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1964), St. Louis, I.M. & So.
Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
211The constitutionality of the act was established in Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). An earlier effort by Congress to subject all carriers engaged
in interstate commerce to the provisions of a similar act, Act of June 11, 1906, ch.
3073, 34 Stat. 232, was held unconstitutional in The Employers' Liability Cases, 207
U.S. 463 (1908).
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state.2 42

general death act of the
However, in only two jurisdictions,
243
244
Ohio
and Wisconsin,
was the state employers' liability act
brought into complete conformity with the existing state death
pattern. Instead, the death provisions of the parent federal statute
were generally incorporated verbatim into the so-called little federal
employers' liability acts. Conformity was thus achieved with respect
to interstate and intrastate railroad employee deaths, but only at the
price of further disrupting the state's own statutory death scheme. 245
242

This was the approach of some of the earlier liability statutes. See notes 226-28

supra
and accompanying text.
2

18 Omo GEN. CODE 1910, §§ 9013, 9016-18, Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Francis,
32 Ohio C.C. Dec. 189 (Cir. Ct. 1910), aff'd mem., 83 Ohio St. 520, 94 N.E. 1113

(1911).

244 Wis. Laws 1907, ch. 254, at 903 (text of act at 495).

2

1In the following paragraphs the situation is described as it existed at the time of
the enactment of the state's railroad employers' liability act. In many instances subsequent modifications of the death statutes, or occasionally the employers' liability
measures, have obviated or modified the discrepancies. It should also be noted that
some of the state employers' liability statutes were not restricted to railroad employee
accidents.
The only distinction between the following statutes and those included in note 233
supra, is that those listed here were obviously inspired by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
Alaska: The employers' liability act of this state, Alaska Laws 1913, ch. 45, at 84,
contained the same provision for distribution of judgment proceeds that was included
in the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Alaskan death statute prevailing at
the time, Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 37, § 353, 31 Stat. 392, however, provided that the
proceeds of recovery in a death action should be distributed as if they were unbequeathed assets in the hands of the administrator, or, under certain conditions, as
personal property of the decedent.
Up until 1955 damages under the general wrongful death act were measured in
terms of the loss of accumulations that deceased would have left to his estate had he
reached normal life expectancy. Alaska Laws 1955, ch. 153, at 315. See discussion in
Kreidler v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, 10 Alaska 365 (1943).
Arizona: The situation here is particularly complex. In 1912 the Arizona legislature enacted an elective workmen's compensation statute, Ariz. Laws 1912, Spec.
Sess., ch. 14, at 23, also cited in Amiz. REv. STAT. §§ 3163-79 (Pattee 1913), and also
passed an employers' liability act covering all hazardous occupations, Ariz. Laws 1912,
ch. 89, at 491, also cited in ARrz. REv. STAT. §§ 3153-62 (Pattee 1913). This latter
statute was a hybrid. Unlike a workmen's compensation statute, it provided for an
award of general damages for both injury and death, but like a workmen's compensation statute, it allowed recovery even if the employer was not at fault, provided that
the employee was not himself negligent. Ariz. Laws 1912, ch. 89, § 6, at 493, also
cited in Aiuz. Ray. STAT. § 3158 (Iattee 1913).
Section 6 also provided in case of death that if there was a surviving spouse or
children, the personal representative should bring suit, but if not, the employee's
parents should bring suit, and that the recovery was for the benefit first of spouse
and children, then parents, and then dependent next of kin. The death act prevailing at this time, Asuz. Rav. STAT. § 3373 (Pattee 1913), stated that the personal
representative should institute suit and "the amount recovered in every such action
shall be distributed to the parties and in the proportions provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal estate left by persons dying intestate." Cf. Bryan
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v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 23 Ariz. 541, 544-45, 205 Pac. 904, 905 (1922),
where the intricacies of the employers' liability act confused even a "distinguished
practitioner."
Arkansas: The employers' liability act, Ark. Acts 1911, No. 88, at 55, was copied
almost verbatim from the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The provisions concerning beneficiaries and distribution differed substantially from those of Arkansas'
then prevailing wrongful death act, Ark. Acts 1883, No. 53, § 2, at 76. The supreme
court of the state held that the distribution provisions of the 1911 act should
control whenever the death fell within its coverage. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 186 Ark.
1082, 57 S.W.2d 818 (1933); Murphy v. Province, 153 Ark. 240, 240 S.W. 421 (1922).
Colorado: In 1937 the Colorado legislature enacted a railroad employees' statute,
Colo. Laws 1937, ch. 136, at 512, which incorporated much of the language of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, but which went beyond the federal measure in
several respects: Assumption of risk was completely abolished under the Colorado
measure, Colo. Laws 1937, ch. 136, § 3, at 513. This was not done under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act until 1939, Act of Aug. 11, 1939, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C.
§ 54 (1964). Under the provisions of the 1937 Colorado statute questions of both
cause-in-fact and proximate cause were to be for the exclusive determination of the
jury, Colo. Laws 1937, ch. 136, § 4, at 513.
It may be recalled that at this time Colorado maintained two separate death
statutes. See section III D of this article supra. One of these, relating exclusively
to deaths inflicted by public carriers, was strictly a penal measure, while the other,
relating to all other defendants, was similar to Lord Campbell's Act. The 1937
employers' liability statute differed in its death provisions from both measures.
For example, § 1 provided for liability "in case of the death of such employe, to his
or her personal representative for the benefit of the surviving widow, or husband,
children, parents, or dependents of such employe ....
"
District of Columbia: The Federal Employers' Liability Act is by its terms made
expressly applicable to injuries and deaths occurring in the District of Columbia.
Section 2, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 52 (1964). The general death act prevailing
in the district in 1908 established no priorities among beneficiaries and ordered
damages to be dispensed according to the statute of distributions. Act of March 3,
1901, ch. 854, § 1303, 31 Stat. 1395.
Georgia: The employers' liability act of this state, Ga. Acts 1909, No. 289, at 160,
also cited in GA. Civ. CODE 1910, §§ 2782-87, generally followed the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. The general death act then prevailing, GA. CIV. CODE 1910, § 4424,
authorized a suit by a mother for the death of a dependent child. In Williams v.
Western & At. R.R., 142 Ga. 696, 83 S.E. 525 (1914), the supreme court of the state
dismissed a suit by a mother for the death of a child employed by the defendant
railroad, holding that the employers' liability act prevailed over the general death
statute, and hence that suit must be brought by the personal representative.
Michigan: In 1909 the legislature adopted a railroad employers' liability statute,
Mich. Acts 1909, No. 104, at 210, modeled in nearly every respect after the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. This statute in § 1 included the federal provisions for
suit by the personal representative and established virtually the same preference
order for claimants as that of the federal measure. Section 6 of the Michigan act,
however, provided in substance that none of its provisions should impair the rights
of employees under existing state law. At the time of the enactment of the railroad
measure the Michigan courts regarded claims for all noninstantaneous deaths as
actionable exclusively under the Michigan survival statute, while claims for instantaneous death gave rise to a suit under the state's general death act. Dolson v. Lakeshore & Mich. So. Ry., 128 Mich. 444, 87 N.W. 629 (1901).
The first question to arise in Michigan was whether the death provision of the
employers' liability statute should be regarded as establishing a new and distinct
approach to the death problem or whether railroad employee deaths should be
assimilated under the prevailing dichotomy of instantaneous versus noninstantaneous
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death. The latter approach was adopted in Habitz v. Wabash R.R., 170 Mich. 71,
77-78, 135 N.W. 827, 830 (1912), where the court held the survival measures was not
available to the plaintiff, and that, since death was not instantaneous, full recovery
could be had for the deceased's loss of earnings through the period of his normal life
expectancy, as allowed by the doctrine of Olivier v. Houghton Co. St.-Ry., 138 Mich. 242,
101 N.W. 530 (1904). "The obvious purpose [of the Michigan employers' liability act]
...is to change the common-law rules as to liability of common carrier railroads and
not to interfere with or change the measure of damages as already fixed by existing
law." Fernette v. Pere Marquette R.R., 175 Mich. 653, 672, 141 N.W. 1084, 1091
(1913) (dictum). When, however, the death of a railroad employee was occasioned
during the course of an interstate railroad operation, thus forcing resort to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, the Michigan court held that the death provisions of the
federal statute, including the measure of damages thereunder, should be interpreted
in accordance with federal decisions, even though the language of the federal measure
is similar to that of the Michigan statute. Jorgensen v. Grand Rapids & Ind. Ry., 189
Mich. 537, 540-43, 155 N.W. 535, 536-47 (1915).
Minnesota: In 1915 the Minnesota legislature adopted an employers' liability
statute which was modeled in nearly every respect after the amended Federal Employers' Liability Act. The survival provision of the original Minnesota act, however,
directed that the beneficiaries themselves, rather than the representative, should
bring suit. Minn. Laws 1915, ch. 187, § 7, at 254. This discrepancy was removed by
Minn. Laws 1923, ch. 333, § 3, at 486. At the time of the enactment of this measure
the Minnesota general wrongful death statute, which was the only remedy available
in the event of death, was modeled after Lord Campbell's Act. It provided a maximum recovery of $7,500 for the benefit of designated beneficiaries. MINN. REv. LAWS
1905, § 4503, amended by Minn. Laws 1911, ch. 281, at 395, also cited in MINN. GEN.
STAT. § 8175 (Tiffany 1913). Other discrepancies are discussed in Note, 6 MINN. L.
REv. 584 (1922). It is also noteworthy that apart from the employers' liability act
there was no provision for survival in Minnesota.
The Minnesota courts have held consistently that whenever a cause of action falls
within the purview of the 1915 statute the death provisions of that statute alone
shall control. E.g., Lombard v. Northern Pac. Ry., 160 Minn. 1, 199 N.V. 887 (1924)
($7,500 limitation on damages under general death statute did not apply in suit under
employers' liability act); cf. Edelbrock v. Minneapolis, St. P. &S. Ste. M. Ry., 166 Minn.
1, 206 N.W. 945 (1926) (plaintiff can plead both statutes and recover if either is found
to be applicable), 10 MINN. L. Rxv. 417 (1926).
Nebraska: The situation in Nebraska is similar to that in Alaska, Arizona, and
Arkansas. The prevailing death act provided for suit by the representative, and for
distribution of the judgment proceeds according to the law of descent. NaB. COMP.
STAT. 1905, ch. 21, at 101, amended by Neb. Laws 1907, ch. 47, at 190. The employers' liability act of the state established the same death procedure as under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Neb. Laws 1907, ch. 48, §1, at 191.
New Mexico: Up until 1955 the New Mexico statutory provision that would be
most nearly applicable to the death of a railroad employee was the 1882 act appearing
in N.M. CoMP. LAws 1884, tit. 33, ch. 23, §§2308-16. See section III D of this article
supra. As amended by N.M. Laws 1891, ch. 42, § 2, it authorized a penal action for
$5,000 foxr the death of any person killed by a railroad. The New Mexico Supreme
Court had held, however, that this measure did not abrogate the common law
fellow-servant rule. Lutz v. Atlantic & Pac. R.R., 6 N.M. 496, 30 Pac. 912 (1892).
In 1911 the voters of New Mexico ratified a constitutional provision which made
railroads liable for injuries and deaths of employees caused by the negligence of fellow
workers. N.M. CONsr. art. XX, § 16. It included an express provision for death that
tracked the language of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Thus the family of a
railroad worker killed through the negligence of a fellow employee would receive
general damages without limitation, while any other person killed through the operation of a railroad had to seek the $5,000 penal award. The constitutional provision also
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CONCLUSION

The pattern of legislative inconsistencies and distortions described in the foregoing pages affords only a partial picture of the
overall American scene of the past century. Most of the earlier
troubles have been ironed out through later amendments or repeals.
Moreover, most of our state legislatures resisted from the outset all
temptation to deal separately with death suits against public carriers or to afford separate treatment for the deaths of workers killed
through the negligence of fellow servants. In most instances, a
single legislative attack was initiated against all wrongful deaths,
howsoever caused. But even in these states the theory or approach
adopted, however, uniformly it might be applied throughout the
entire jurisdiction was frequently conceived in haste by the lawmakers and tended to break down when placed into practical operation. Too often there was imposed upon the statutory structure
an agglomerate of judicial patchwork as courts attempted to obscure
the problems or to reconcile the irreconcilable. The need to evolve
a single adequate and realistic approach for the handling of wrongful death has proffered a baffling challenge to legislatures and courts
for more than a century, and in many instances the complete answer
is yet to be found. The quest for a theory will be discussed in the
second and concluding installment of this study of the history of
American fatal accident law.
provided different beneficiaries and a different method of distribution of judgment
proceeds than the then prevailing general wrongful death act of New Mexico, N.M.
Comp. LAWs 1897, tit. 33, ch. 23, § 2315.
North Dakota: The general death act prevailing in North Dakota in 1915 was
similar to Lord Campbell's Act, and provided for suit by the individual beneficiaries
designated in the statute. 2 N.D. CoMP. LAWs 1913, ch. 89, § 8823. There was no
general provision for the survival of personal injury claims in North Dakota at that
time. In 1915 the state adopted an employers' liability act almost identical to the
federal statute, including the survival provision. N.D. Laws 1915, ch. 207, at 811.
South Dakota: The South Dakota statute of 1911, S.D. Laws 1911, ch. 206, §§ 1-7,
at 294, is very similar to the federal statute. It differs from the then prevailing death
statute, S.D. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 801, at 497, less sharply than in some other states.
Under § 8 of the South Dakota death statute the parents and next of kin of the
deceased constitute a single grouping, and there is no express requirement that these
claimants establish their dependency upon the deceased. This agrees with § 1 of the
employers' liability statute, except that under it next of kin must show dependency.
However, § 3 of the general death act imposes a limitation of $10,000 on the amount
recoverable while no limitation is found in the employers' liability act.

